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“THE ESSENCE OF A FREE SOCIETY”: THE 
EXECUTIVE POWERS LEGACY OF JUSTICE 
STEVENS AND THE FUTURE OF FOREIGN 
AFFAIRS DEFERENCE 
Dawn Johnsen 
ABSTRACT—After 9/11, Justice John Paul Stevens insisted the United 
States maintain its foundational commitment to the rule of law—the very 
“essence of a free society.” Justice Stevens led the Court’s scrutiny and 
rejection of early Bush Administration policies regarding the detention and 
prosecution of suspected terrorists. Since it lost Justice Stevens’s passionate 
and principled voice in 2008, the Court has not addressed the scope of the 
President’s military detention authority. This Article considers Justice 
Stevens’s role in the Court’s altered stance, and also a complementary 
explanation: the Obama Administration’s improved interpretation and 
exercise of executive authority. Informed and inspired by Justice Stevens’s 
jurisprudence, a post-9/11 academic debate explores the deference due the 
Executive’s statutory and treaty interpretations on foreign affairs matters, 
appropriately favoring an intermediate measure of foreign affairs deference 
that provides a meaningful judicial check while respecting the Executive’s 
constitutional authority and expertise. This Article highlights the Bush 
Administration’s extraordinarily flawed theory and often secret claims of 
authority to contravene federal statutes that effectively forfeited its claim to 
judicial deference. Prevailing narratives that emphasize continuity—
between the Bush and Obama policies as well as presidential power 
aggrandizements—underappreciate the unusual, arguably unique, nature of 
the Bush approach’s threat to the rule of law. Future judicial review of 
foreign affairs matters might not be as robust as some hope and others fear. 
Only the combination of judicial review and continued vigilance from 
nonjudicial sources can effectively check the Executive during times of war 
and crisis. The Article concludes by briefly assessing President Obama’s 
performance on rule-of-law issues that might never face judicial review. 
 
AUTHOR—Walter W. Foskett Professor of Law, Indiana University Maurer 
School of Law. For their thoughtful suggestions and generosity with their 
time and ideas, I am deeply grateful to David Barron, Robert Chesney, 
Daniel Conkle, Martin Lederman, Deborah Pearlstein, Ryan Scott, Stephen 
Vladeck, the Cornell Law School faculty workshop series participants, and 
my exceptional research assistant, Eric Spengler. 
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INTRODUCTION 
During his extraordinary career on the U.S. Supreme Court, Justice 
John Paul Stevens distinguished himself on a wide range of vital issues 
affecting the nation. His opinions on issues of executive power may be his 
most enduring legacy. His very first majority opinion, the relatively 
unknown Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong,1 reviewed the power of an Executive 
Branch agency to limit certain federal jobs to U.S. citizens. Justice Stevens 
also wrote for the majority in several landmark executive power cases. 
Clinton v. Jones2 allowed a civil lawsuit to proceed against a sitting 
president for conduct alleged to have occurred before he took office. 
Clinton v. City of New York3 invalidated a federal statute that afforded the 
President what Congress termed a “line-item veto.” One of the most cited 
Supreme Court opinions of all time,4 Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC,5 
articulated standards to govern judicial review of Executive Branch 
statutory interpretations. For a quarter-century after Chevron, as the Court 
wrestled with its application, Justice Stevens authored influential opinions 
on issues that clarified Chevron’s reach and closely divided the Court.6 
And then came September 11th. Justice Stevens led the Court in 
checking executive excesses in counterterrorism efforts following the 
September 11, 2001 attacks. At a time when the President strongly resisted 
 
1  426 U.S. 88 (1976). 
2  520 U.S. 681 (1997). 
3  524 U.S. 417 (1998). 
4  See, e.g., Cass R. Sunstein, Beyond Marbury: The Executive’s Power to Say What the Law Is, 
115 YALE L.J. 2580, 2580 (2006) (noting that Chevron has become the “most cited case in modern 
public law”). 
5  467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
6  See infra notes 157–65 and accompanying text. 
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checks on terrorism policies from Congress and the courts—claiming broad 
constitutional authority to ignore such limits—the Supreme Court insisted 
otherwise. Justice Stevens’s post-9/11 opinions will stand as powerful, 
historic examples of the United States’ commitment to the rule of law and 
the judiciary’s role in safeguarding it. 
That the Court would provide a meaningful check on unlawful 
terrorism policies was not preordained. In the months following the 9/11 
terrorist attacks, conventional wisdom, supported by precedent, predicted 
that the Court would afford strong deference to President George W. Bush’s 
choices.7 Foreign affairs, national security, war powers—these all top the 
list of areas in which the judiciary historically has practiced the greatest 
restraint and deference in reviewing executive action, albeit inspiring fierce 
debate and occasionally leading to spectacularly bad results.8 
Justice Stevens, more than any other Justice, is rightfully credited with 
building the majorities behind the Court’s willingness to scrutinize and 
reject early Bush Administration policies regarding the detention and 
prosecution of those suspected of terrorism—particularly those detained, 
interrogated, and prosecuted outside of the United States’ civilian system 
and geographic boundaries in Guantánamo Bay, Cuba. In Rasul v. Bush,9 
Justice Stevens wrote for the Court, which held that the federal habeas 
corpus statute encompassed the Guantánamo detainees, permitting them to 
 
7  See, e.g., William Glaberson, Government Has Power to Curb Some Freedoms, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 
19, 2001, at B7 (“[L]egal experts say the courts have effectively ceded to the government vast powers to 
limit many freedoms when the nation’s security was threatened in the past. . . . [M]any of the new limits 
may never receive rigorous court review.”). Of course, from the outset, critics argued vehemently 
against the legality and for judicial review of the early, contested Bush policies. See, e.g., Neal K. Katyal 
& Laurence H. Tribe, Waging War, Deciding Guilt: Trying the Military Tribunals, 111 YALE L.J. 1259, 
1277 (2002) (arguing congressional authorization was required for President Bush’s military 
commissions). 
8  The Court’s now-infamous decisions upholding discrimination against Japanese Americans during 
World War II out of deference to the Executive’s national security judgments stand in sharp contrast to 
the Court’s post-9/11 rulings and as reminders of the danger of excessive judicial deference. See 
Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944) (upholding an “exclusion order” forcing Japanese 
Americans living in designated military zones to move from their homes to detention camps); 
Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81 (1943) (unanimously upholding a curfew imposed on 
Japanese Americans in designated military areas). Justice Stevens served as a law clerk in 1947 to 
Justice Wiley Rutledge, who experienced “anguish” over his role in those cases. Craig Green, Wiley 
Rutledge, Executive Detention, and Judicial Conscience at War, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 99, 139 n.174 
(2006) (citing JOHN M. FERREN, SALT OF THE EARTH, CONSCIENCE OF THE COURT: THE STORY OF 
JUSTICE WILEY RUTLEDGE 245 (2004)). Several commentators have described the extraordinary 
influences that clerkship experience apparently had on Justice Stevens’s post-9/11 opinions. See, e.g., 
Green, supra, at 114–15 (discussing, among other opinions, the role of Justice Rutledge’s dissent in In 
re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1, 41 (1946) (Rutledge, J., dissenting)); Joseph T. Thai, The Law Clerk Who 
Wrote Rasul v. Bush: John Paul Stevens’s Influence from World War II to the War on Terror, 92 VA. L. 
REV. 501, 507–13 (2006) (discussing the influence of Justice Rutledge’s dissent in Ahrens v. Clark, 335 
U.S. 188, 193 (1948) (Rutledge, J., dissenting), on which Justice Stevens worked as Justice Rutledge’s 
law clerk). 
9  542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
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challenge the legality of their detention in federal court. The Court’s finding 
that the rule of law—at least the law of habeas—governed these military 
detentions thwarted the Bush Administration’s efforts to create a detention 
center beyond the reach of the federal courts and the protections of U.S. 
law. In Justice Stevens’s majority opinion in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld,10 the 
Court declared unlawful the Bush Administration’s system of military 
commissions. The Court’s reasoning also made evident the illegality of the 
Administration’s use of torture and other extreme interrogation policies. In 
Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,11 the Court held that the government could not 
preventively detain U.S. citizens as “enemy combatants” without providing 
certain due process protections, including the right to challenge the 
detention and to have the advice of counsel. Justice Stevens would have 
gone further in protecting liberty and joined a dissent by Justice Antonin 
Scalia that found this uncharged, preventive detention of a U.S. citizen 
unlawful absent a congressional suspension of the writ of habeas corpus.12 
Justice Stevens insisted on maintaining the United States’ foundational 
commitment to being a nation ruled by law—a government of laws and not 
of men. His vigorous dissent in Rumsfeld v. Padilla objected to the Court’s 
dismissal of the case on jurisdictional grounds and declared that Jose 
Padilla’s lengthy detention without charge threatened the very “essence of a 
free society”: “Even more important than the method of selecting the 
people’s rulers and their successors is the character of the constraints 
imposed on the Executive by the rule of law.”13 Among his colleagues, 
Justice Stevens maintained an extraordinary faith in the ability of the 
courts—of judges—to exercise the principled judgment necessary to uphold 
the rule of law and to check the political branches when they stray. 
After deciding five military detention cases in five years, the Supreme 
Court has not since 2008 decided the merits of another case that involves 
the rights of Guantánamo detainees or otherwise defines the scope of the 
President’s military detention authority.14 This lack of Court activity was 
 
10  548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
11  542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
12  See id. at 554 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
13  542 U.S. 426, 455, 465 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
14  The Court held in 2008 that Congress had acted in violation of the Constitution’s Suspension 
Clause by depriving Guantánamo detainees of habeas review without providing an adequate alternative. 
See Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008). The Court granted certiorari in two detainee cases after 
Boumediene, but did not address the scope of military detention authority in either. In al-Marri v. 
Spagone, 555 U.S. 1220 (2009) (mem.), the Court granted certiorari to vacate as moot the Fourth 
Circuit’s en banc decision upholding the military detention of a noncitizen arrested within the United 
States after the government transferred the detainee to civilian custody for prosecution by criminal 
indictment. And in Kiyemba v. Obama, 130 S. Ct. 1235 (2010) (per curiam), the Court originally granted 
certiorari to answer the question “whether a federal court exercising habeas jurisdiction has the power to 
order the release of prisoners held at Guantanamo Bay ‘where the Executive detention is indefinite and 
without authorization in law, and release into the continental United States is the only possible effective 
remedy.’” Id. at 1235 (quoting Petition for Writ of Certiorari at i, Kiyemba, 130 S. Ct. 1235 (No. 08-
106:467  (2012) “The Essence of a Free Society” 
 471 
particularly remarkable during the year following Justice Stevens’s 2010 
retirement, when the Court denied certiorari in six Guantánamo cases from 
the D.C. Circuit.15 Also striking is the D.C. Circuit’s treatment of detainees 
in these and other cases: not a single detainee has won a clear victory before 
the D.C. Circuit and not one has attained a ruling for his release.16 Critics 
have attacked the court’s reasoning in some of these cases (and even more, 
the reasoning in some of the separate concurrences and dissents) as not 
faithful to the Supreme Court’s detainee rulings.17 
In her June 2011 end-of-Term “Scorecard,” longtime New York Times 
Supreme Court reporter Linda Greenhouse described the Court’s “voice on 
Guantánamo” as “missing in action”;18 elsewhere she concluded that the 
Court might be “finally finished with Guantánamo,”19 possibly due to 
 
1234), 2009 WL 934097). The Court ultimately declined to reach the merits, however, because by the 
time the case reached the Court “each of the detainees . . . ha[d] received at least one offer of 
resettlement in another country,” and the Court found that this “change in the underlying facts” mooted 
the question presented. Id. The Supreme Court therefore vacated and remanded to the D.C. Circuit, id., 
which effectively reinstated its original ruling—a decision that some legal scholars have criticized as not 
faithful to the Supreme Court’s due process analysis in Boumediene. See Stephen I. Vladeck, The D.C. 
Circuit After Boumediene, 41 SETON HALL L. REV. 1451, 1477–78 (2011) (“Kiyemba I reached its due 
process holding by effectively ignoring Boumediene . . . .”). When a second petition for certiorari in the 
case reached the Court, Justice Elena Kagan recused herself and the Court denied certiorari. See 
Kiyemba v. Obama, 131 S. Ct. 1631 (2011). Four of the Justices—Stephen Breyer, Anthony Kennedy, 
Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Sonia Sotomayor—filed an opinion respecting the denial of certiorari that 
gives rise to the question of whether the Court would have granted certiorari the second time had Justice 
Stevens not retired. 
15  See Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d 1102 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1001 (2011); Al 
Odah v. United States, 611 F.3d 8 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1812 (2011); Awad v. 
Obama, 608 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1814 (2011); Kiyemba v. Obama, 605 F.3d 
1046 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1631 (2011); Ameziane v. Obama, 620 F.3d 1 (D.C. Cir. 
2010), cert denied, 131 S. Ct. 1673 (2011); Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. 
denied, 131 S. Ct. 1814 (2011). 
16  See, e.g., Peter Finn & Del Quentin Wilber, On Appeals, Detainees Have Never Won, WASH. 
POST, July 6, 2011, at A1. Notably, in four of the five cases in which the Court reached the merits and 
rejected the Bush Administration’s policies, the Court reversed the courts of appeals, which were more 
inclined toward the Executive. See infra Part II. 
17  The New York Times, for example, editorialized against the D.C. Circuit’s handling of detainees’ 
claims and in favor of Supreme Court review in 2011: “The appellate court has all but nullified that view 
of judicial power and responsibility backed by Justice Kennedy and the court majority [in Boumediene]. 
The Supreme Court should remind the appellate court which one leads the federal judicial system and 
which has a solemn duty to follow.” Editorial, A Right Without a Remedy, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 1, 2011, at 
A26. In the year following, the D.C. Circuit’s criticism, and arguable defiance, has intensified. See infra 
note 23 and Part III.C. For a thoughtful and thorough review of the D.C. Circuit’s post-Boumediene 
decisions, see Vladeck, supra note 14. 
18  Linda Greenhouse, A Supreme Court Scorecard, N.Y. TIMES OPINIONATOR (July 13, 2011, 9:30 
PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/07/13/a-supreme-court-scorecard. 
19  Linda Greenhouse, Gitmo Fatigue at the Supreme Court, N.Y. TIMES OPINIONATOR (Apr. 6, 
2011, 8:45 PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2011/04/06/gitmo-fatigue-at-the-supreme-court. 
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“Gitmo [f]atigue.”20 Among other theories, veteran Court observer Lyle 
Denniston suggested that “the Court no longer has as strong a champion of 
detainees’ legal claims now that Justice John Paul Stevens has retired.”21 
Undoubtedly, Justice Stevens championed detainees’ rights and the 
rule of law while on the Court, and the loss of his passionate and principled 
voice inevitably altered internal Court dynamics on detainee issues. This 
Article will review his vital role and also consider another, complementary 
explanation for the Court’s altered stance: in light of changes in the 
government’s detainee policies since President Barack Obama took office, 
the Court may have perceived less of a need to provide a check on 
executive power and therefore reverted to a stance more typical of judicial 
review on matters of foreign affairs. This explanation runs counter to a 
prevailing narrative, from the ideological right and left, that emphasizes 
continuity between the Bush and Obama Administrations’ counterterrorism 
policies, as well as general presidential aggrandizement of power. 
Notwithstanding understandable disappointment from some quarters with 
the degree of change, executive policy in fact has changed markedly under 
President Obama, particularly when evaluated in respects relevant to 
judicial review and executive legal compliance. The various influences 
behind the Supreme Court’s decisions not to review the merits of additional 
detainee cases since 2008 almost certainly include substantial 
improvements in the Executive’s interpretation and exercise of its legal 
authorities—changes prompted in part by the Court’s earlier detainee 
decisions.22 If the Court decides to reengage, the reason might stem less 
from any perceived ongoing executive abuse and more from the D.C. 
Circuit’s sharp criticism of the Supreme Court’s rulings recognizing 
detainees’ rights.23 
 
20  Id. After noting that the Court’s decisions all “required the expenditure of substantial amounts of 
institutional capital,” Greenhouse concluded: “My sense is that the well, at least for now, has run dry. 
The court was there when we needed it, for which, as a citizen, I am grateful. If it now has nothing 
constructive to say, it has earned its rest.” Id. 
21  Lyle Denniston, D.C. Circuit in Control on Detainees, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 4, 2011, 9:36 AM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2011/04/dc-circuit-in-control-on-detainees. 
22  Citation of detainees’ zero-win record in the D.C. Circuit without more may be misleading. It 
does not account for either detainee victories in the district court that the government did not appeal, or 
government decisions to release and transfer detainees voluntarily. For a summary of the status of the 
Guantánamo habeas cases and a discussion of the complications of compiling a win–loss record, see 
Benjamin Wittes, Robert M. Chesney & Larkin Reynolds, The Emerging Law of Detention 2.0: The 
Guantánamo Habeas Cases as Lawmaking, BROOKINGS INSTITUTION 7–11 (Apr. 2011), http://www.
brookings.edu/~/media/Files/rc/reports/2011/05_guantanamo_wittes/05_guantanamo_wittes.pdf. This 
valuable report, for example, cites seventeen cases in which detention was deemed or conceded unlawful 
and fourteen cases in which detainees prevailed where either the government did not appeal or the initial 
appeal was later dismissed. Id. at 10. 
23  Shortly before this Article went to press, the Supreme Court denied certiorari in seven 
Guantánamo cases, including one in which a panel of the D.C. Circuit, in the course of holding against a 
detainee, had criticized the Supreme Court in exceptionally harsh and provocative terms: 
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Part I of this Article examines the Court’s rulings, and the Bush 
Administration’s arguments to the Court, in each of the 9/11 detainee cases. 
One useful lens for evaluation focuses on the appropriate role of the courts 
vis-à-vis the Executive on matters of “foreign affairs”—a phrase this Article 
uses to encompass war powers and national security. The review therefore 
highlights the Administration’s arguments for judicial restraint and 
deference, which the Court overwhelmingly rejected. Immediately apparent 
are vital roles played by two Justices: Justice Stevens, as the chief 
proponent of vigorous judicial review, and Justice Anthony Kennedy, the 
more hesitant Justice in the middle of the Court, who ultimately cast the 
deciding vote to play that strong judicial role. 
In striking down various counterterrorism policies, the Court rejected 
the Bush Administration’s legal interpretations of statutes and treaties and, 
less directly, its interpretations of its own constitutional war powers. This 
ignited a vibrant debate among legal academics and other commentators 
over the degree of deference due the Executive’s legal interpretations on 
foreign affairs matters, which is the subject of Part II. Justice Stevens’s 
refusal to defer to the Executive’s views in the detainee cases features 
prominently, as does his approach to deference on domestic issues in 
Chevron and its progeny. Informed and inspired by Justice Stevens’s 
jurisprudence, the post-9/11 literature makes great strides toward 
developing an appropriately balanced approach to foreign affairs 
deference—one that checks executive abuses while respecting the 
Executive’s constitutional authorities and expertise on foreign affairs 
matters. 
Part III seeks to supplement the otherwise-rich deference debate by 
highlighting one relatively unexamined aspect: the extraordinarily flawed 
nature of the theory of executive authority and other legal interpretations 
that informed the Bush Administration’s early counterterrorism policies. 
The reasons for the Court’s aggressive review undoubtedly are multiple and 
include a recognition of the judiciary’s special role in protecting individual 
liberty—as painfully underscored by Korematsu’s lesson in the risks of 
 
As the dissenters warned and as the amount of ink spilled in this single case attests, Boumediene’s 
airy suppositions have caused great difficulty for the Executive and the courts. Luckily, this is a 
shrinking category of cases. The ranks of Guantanamo detainees will not be replenished. 
Boumediene fundamentally altered the calculus of war, guaranteeing that the benefit of 
intelligence that might be gained—even from high-value detainees—is outweighed by the 
systemic cost of defending detention decisions. While the court in Boumediene expressed 
sensitivity to such concerns, it did not find them “dispositive.”  Boumediene’s logic is compelling: 
take no prisoners. Point taken. 
Latif v. Obama, 666 F.3d 746, 764 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citations omitted), reissued, 677 F.3d 1175 (D.C. 
Cir. 2012), cert. denied, 80 U.S.L.W. 3510, 80 U.S.L.W. 3676 (U.S. June 11, 2012) (No. 11-1027). The 
New York Times editorialized against the Court’s denials of certiorari: “[I]t is devastatingly clear that the 
Roberts court has no interest in ensuring meaningful habeas review for foreign prisoners.” Editorial, The 
Court Retreats on Habeas, N.Y. TIMES, June 14, 2012, at A34. 
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excessive judicial deference to the Executive.24 Beyond the protection of 
detainees’ rights, one likely principal influence behind the Court’s refusal to 
defer was what the Court knew to be the extreme and deficient nature of 
some of the Bush Administration’s secret legal interpretations: most 
notorious, that waterboarding was not torture and thus not a crime under the 
federal criminal anti-torture statute—and that, in any event, the President 
could disregard federal laws that he believed constrained his war powers. 
The popular understanding of the Bush Administration’s 
counterterrorism policies underappreciates the unusual, arguably unique, 
nature of the threat they posed to the rule of law and constitutional 
structure. Other presidents have taken legally dubious actions based on 
excessive views of their substantive war powers. Wartime Presidents 
Abraham Lincoln and Franklin D. Roosevelt come to mind; indeed, some of 
President Bush’s advocates have compared him favorably to Presidents 
Lincoln and Roosevelt. Their actions, however, are fundamentally 
distinguishable: Presidents Lincoln and Roosevelt acted openly, engaged in 
public debate about the legality of their actions, and, most critically, 
acknowledged Congress’s ultimate authority to resolve the particular 
matters in dispute. President Bush relied on deeply flawed and often secret 
legal interpretations to make erroneous claims of preclusive constitutional 
war powers—that is, authority to act in direct violation of statutes enacted 
by Congress or similar laws Congress might enact in the future.25 In the two 
most significant examples, detainee interrogations and domestic 
surveillance, the Bush Administration acted in secret for more than a year 
(until the programs leaked), in effect depriving Congress of the ability even 
to consider executive oversight or amendment of the relevant statute. 
President Bush and others in his Administration bore awesome 
responsibilities and undoubtedly were motivated by the desire to protect the 
nation from terrorism. Their choice of methods, however, at times reflected 
an explicit ideological preference to act unilaterally in order to expand 
presidential war powers relative to Congress, and create a more powerful 
presidency for future Administrations. Part III reviews what was publicly 
known when the Court issued its 9/11 detainee rulings about the Bush 
Administration’s deviations from longstanding executive practices, and 
posits that—through failures of legal interpretation and execution of a 
constitutional dimension—the Bush Administration effectively forfeited its 
claim to judicial deference. 
 
24  See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944); see also supra note 8. 
25  See David J. Barron & Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb—
Framing the Problem, Doctrine, and Original Understanding, 121 HARV. L. REV. 689 (2008) 
[hereinafter Barron & Lederman, Commander in Chief—Framing the Problem]; David J. Barron & 
Martin S. Lederman, The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb—A Constitutional History, 121 HARV. 
L. REV. 941 (2008) [hereinafter Barron & Lederman, Commander in Chief—History] (providing a 
remarkable survey of presidents’ claims of preclusive war powers, from George Washington to George 
W. Bush, and establishing the exceptional nature of George W. Bush’s claims). 
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Judicial review, although vital, cannot singlehandedly ensure the 
legality of executive action. Essential nonjudicial constraints may be 
undermined by overconfidence in the Court’s willingness to scrutinize 
executive action and an overly cynical view of presidents’ willingness to 
violate legal constraints on war powers. A proper appreciation of the 
atypical nature of the Bush Administration’s claims of preclusive authority 
suggests that future judicial review of foreign affairs matters might not be 
as robust as some hope and others fear. Only the combined effects of 
judicial review and continued vigilance from nonjudicial sources—
Congress, the press, the American public, the international community, and 
even sources within the Executive Branch—can effectively keep the 
Executive in check during times of war and national crisis. In that spirit, 
Part III concludes by moving beyond the courts and foreign affairs 
deference to a brief assessment of President Obama’s performance on rule-
of-law issues that might never be the subject of plenary judicial review. 
I. THE SUPREME COURT’S 9/11 DETAINEE CASES 
In adjudicating challenges to detainee policies, the federal courts 
repeatedly confront a difficult question that is as old as the Constitution: 
What role should the judiciary play in reviewing executive action in the 
realm of foreign affairs? Faced with challenges to its claims of power to 
detain, interrogate, and try before military tribunals those it suspected of 
terrorism, the Bush Administration invoked the full range of available 
doctrines and practices the Court long has relied upon to constrain judicial 
review: political question, mootness, ripeness, and abstention doctrines; 
state secrets and other privileges; discretionary Supreme Court review; and 
deferential standards of review for the Executive’s legal interpretations, 
factual determinations, and actions. Although distinct in many respects, 
these various doctrines reflect similar considerations regarding 
constitutional structure and the three branches’ authorities and relative 
competencies—considerations that often lead courts to afford the Executive 
some measure of deference. One common approach across the doctrines 
and practices weighs judicial protection of individual liberties and the rule 
of law against respect for the Executive’s superior political accountability 
and functional abilities on matters of foreign affairs.26 
In the decades before September 11, 2001, the Supreme Court 
emphasized that on foreign affairs matters the balance specially tips against 
vigorous judicial review.27 The Court sometimes described the deference 
due the Executive in very strong or even absolute terms, along the lines of 
often quoted dicta from the 1936 case United States v. Curtiss-Wright 
 
26  See infra Part II. 
27  See, e.g., Curtis A. Bradley, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, 86 VA. L. REV. 649, 663 
(2000) (“At least when added together, the various categories of deference amount to a very deferential 
approach by United States courts in the foreign affairs area.”). 
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Export Corp., describing “the very delicate, plenary and exclusive power of 
the President as the sole organ of the federal government in the field of 
international relations.”28 Writing just a year before 9/11, Professor Curtis 
Bradley usefully characterized the state of debate on judicial deference due 
the Executive on issues of foreign affairs.29 Bradley described the works of 
academics who aligned themselves at the other end of the deference 
spectrum, far from Curtiss-Wright, where they opposed the prevailing 
notions of foreign affairs deference, including on the ground that it 
subverted the rule of law by largely immunizing foreign affairs from 
judicial review.30 Prominent among critics at that time, Professor Harold 
Koh noted that the “lavish description” of executive authority in Curtiss-
Wright led to its excessive citation by government attorneys, who knew it as 
the “Curtiss-Wright, so I’m right” cite.31 
Given this state of affairs, it is not surprising that the Bush 
Administration generally took a strong Curtiss-Wright-like approach in 
defending its detainee policies, resisting judicial review and arguing for 
strong deference. In each of the Court’s five detainee cases, the Department 
of Justice (DOJ) first urged the Court not to reach the merits of the 
detainees’ claims and then argued in the alternative that, to defeat those 
claims, the Court should defer to the Executive’s views of its constitutional 
authorities and its interpretation and application of statutory and 
international law. DOJ went even further and defied practice, especially in 
its early years, by typically centering its defense of Administration policies 
on a sweeping view of the President’s constitutional authorities, and only 
secondarily addressing relevant statutes that conferred broad executive 
powers.32 
Also surprising was the Supreme Court’s response, in particular its 
rejection of the Bush Administration’s claims with little deference or 
restraint—or even express consideration of whether deference was due the 
Executive.33 To the extent the Court recognized executive power, it looked 
 
28  299 U.S. 304, 320 (1936). 
29  Bradley described five categories of deference: political question deference, executive branch 
lawmaking deference, international facts deference, persuasiveness deference, and Chevron deference. 
Regarding this last category, Bradley noted that courts generally did not use the label “Chevron 
deference” for foreign affairs and the principal focus of his article was to encourage its more deliberate 
application. Bradley, supra note 27, at 659–63. 
30  See id. at 650–51, 665–67. 
31  HAROLD HONGJU KOH, THE NATIONAL SECURITY CONSTITUTION 94 (1990). 
32  Far more than in its briefs, the legal analysis in opinions of the Bush Administration’s Office of 
Legal Counsel (OLC), particularly in the Administration’s first few years, emphasized the President’s 
unilateral and preclusive war powers to initiate war and subject suspected terrorists to military detention 
and trial, warrantless surveillance, and extreme interrogations (even to the point of torture), 
unconstrained by applicable federal statutes. See infra Part III.A. 
33  Justice Stevens dissented from the one ruling in favor of the DOJ’s request to dismiss the case on 
jurisdictional grounds. See Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426, 455 (2004) (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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to statutory sources and avoided grounding authority in the President’s 
constitutional war powers, thereby rejecting the Administration’s preferred 
analysis. The Court looked especially to the September 18, 2001 
Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF) and its meaning in light of 
other acts of Congress.34 A brief review of each of the Court’s five cases, 
with a focus on the Bush Administration’s arguments for deference and 
against judicial review, also reveals special roles played by two Justices: 
Justice Stevens’s leadership driving the Court’s willingness to take a hard 
look and invalidate the challenged policies, and Justice Kennedy’s critical 
and familiar role as the Justice in the middle of the Court. 
A. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld 
The Court issued opinions in the first three cases on a single day: June 
28, 2004. In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld,35 the Court rejected the Bush 
Administration’s claims of constitutional and statutory authority to detain a 
U.S. citizen indefinitely as an “enemy combatant” without affording him 
access to counsel or an opportunity to challenge his detention.36 Six Justices 
wrote opinions, and none commanded a majority; shifting majorities 
resolved various issues. Most central, five Justices agreed that the AUMF 
conferred some military detention authority,37 but eight Justices (all but 
Justice Clarence Thomas) found that the Bush Administration’s policy of 
unilateral, unreviewable detention without counsel violated constitutional or 
statutory protections.38 
The Bush Administration’s DOJ urged the Court to follow the Court of 
Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in “[a]pplying an appropriately deferential 
standard of review”39 that reflected “[r]espect for separation of powers and 
the limited institutional capabilities of courts in matters of military 
 
34  With the AUMF, Congress authorized the President to “use all necessary and appropriate force 
against those nations, organizations, or persons he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided 
the terrorist attacks . . . in order to prevent any future acts of international terrorism against the United 
States by such nations, organizations or persons.” Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No. 
107-40, § 2(a), 115 Stat. 224, 224 (2001). 
35  542 U.S. 507 (2004). 
36  Id. at 527, 533 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion). 
37  Id. at 516–17; id. at 587 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
38  See id. at 532–34, 535–39 (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion); id. at 553–54 (Souter, J., concurring 
in the judgment); id. at 573 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
39  Brief for the Respondents at 10, Hamdi, 542 U.S. 507 (No. 03-6696), 2004 WL 724020, at *10. 
The Fourth Circuit reversed the district court because, as the plurality described, it found that 
“separation of powers principles prohibited a federal court from ‘delv[ing] further into Hamdi’s status 
and capture.’” Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 515 (alteration in original) (quoting Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 316 F.3d 
450, 473 (4th Cir. 2003)); see also id. at 514–15 (“Article III contains nothing analogous to the specific 
powers of war so carefully enumerated in Articles I and II.” (quoting Hamdi, 316 F.3d at 463) (internal 
quotation marks omitted)). 
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decisionmaking in connection with ongoing conflict.”40 As it generally 
would in future detainee cases before the Court, DOJ cited for support, first, 
the President’s constitutional war powers and precedent calling for strong 
deference to the Executive Branch in light of those authorities,41 and 
second, authority under the AUMF and other statutes, which it argued must 
be interpreted in light of the President’s broad constitutional authorities.42 It 
argued for deference also to the Executive’s interpretation of international 
law.43 Finally, on an issue developed further in Rumsfeld v. Padilla,44 DOJ 
defended the policy of denying counsel to detainees until “the military has 
determined that such access would not interfere with ongoing intelligence-
gathering,” but argued that the Court need not reach that issue because the 
military by that time had afforded Hamdi counsel.45 Only Justice Thomas, 
citing the President’s Article II powers and superior expertise, endorsed the 
call for absolute deference to the President’s determination that the 
petitioner was subject to military detention.46 
In the controlling plurality opinion (which Chief Justice William 
Rehnquist and Justices Anthony Kennedy and Stephen Breyer joined), 
Justice Sandra Day O’Connor found the detention violated the Fifth 
Amendment’s guarantee of due process.47 Relying on the international law 
of war to interpret the AUMF, the plurality found the AUMF gave the 
government limited military detention authority, so the Court did not reach 
 
40  Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 527 (alteration in original) (quoting Brief for the Respondents, supra note 39, 
at 26) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
41  See, e.g., Brief for the Respondents, supra note 39, at 13–18, 25–27; see also id. at 25 (“As this 
Court has observed, ‘courts traditionally have been reluctant to intrude upon the authority of the 
Executive in military and national security affairs.’” (quoting Dep’t of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 
530 (1988)); id. (“Matters intimately related to foreign policy and national security are rarely proper 
subjects for judicial intervention.” (quoting Haig v. Agee, 453 U.S. 280, 292 (1981)) (internal quotation 
marks omitted); id. at 34 (warning against “second-guessing in a federal courtroom far removed from 
the battlefield”). 
42  Id. at 19–22; see also id. at 22 (“The canon of constitutional avoidance counsels against 
interpreting Section 4001(a) [of the Non-Detention Act] in a manner that would interfere with the well-
established authority of the Commander in Chief to detain enemy combatants in wartime.”). 
43  Id. at 24 n.9 (“The determination whether captured enemy combatants are entitled to POW 
[prisoner of war] privileges under the GPW [Geneva Convention on Prisoners of War] is a quintessential 
matter that the Constitution (not to mention the GPW) leaves to the political branches and, in particular, 
the President.”). 
44  542 U.S. 426 (2004) (plurality opinion). 
45  Brief for the Respondents, supra note 39, at 43–45. 
46  Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 588 (2004) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“[T]he President’s action 
here is ‘supported by the strongest of presumptions and the widest latitude of judicial interpretation.’” 
(quoting Dames & Moore v. Regan, 453 U.S. 654, 668 (1981))); see Brief for the Respondents, supra 
note 39, at 25 (calling for the “utmost deference” to the President). 
47  Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 532–33 (plurality opinion). 
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the President’s claim of constitutional authority.48 Although the process due 
could reflect military exigencies, the government had afforded Hamdi no 
process at all, and the plurality found that some process was constitutionally 
required (including access to counsel).49 Precedent supported not only the 
general respect owed the President on military matters,50 but also the 
competing commitment to individual liberty and the reality that during 
times of crisis and emergency the Executive Branch faces its “greatest 
temptation to dispense with fundamental constitutional guarantees.”51 The 
plurality flatly rejected DOJ’s argument that separation of powers principles 
required extreme deference; instead, it declared that the Constitution 
“envisions a role for all three branches when individual liberties are at 
stake” and—most memorably—that “a state of war is not a blank check for 
the President.”52 
Justice Stevens joined a dissent by Justice Scalia that would have 
rejected the Bush Administration’s claims even more completely on a 
ground that left no room for deference.53 They instead would have held 
Hamdi’s detention unconstitutional on the ground that Congress had not 
suspended the writ of habeas corpus, which they found a necessary 
prerequisite to the Executive’s ability to hold an American indefinitely 
without charge: “The very core of liberty secured by our Anglo-Saxon 
system of separated powers has been freedom from indefinite imprisonment 
at the will of the Executive.”54 Justice Scalia’s dissent emphasized its very 
limited scope, noting only two detainees at that time were U.S. citizens 
detained in the United States.55 This unusual pairing of Justices was not 
repeated in any other detainee case; in the remaining four, including the 
other two issued that very day, Justices Stevens and Scalia fell on opposite 
sides. 
 
48  Id. at 516–17. The plurality also found the AUMF satisfied the requirement of section 4001(a) of 
the Non-Detention Act, which prohibited detention of a U.S. citizen “except pursuant to an Act of 
Congress.” Id. at 517 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 4001(a) (2000)) (internal quotation mark omitted). 
49  Id. at 533–35, 539. 
50  Id. at 531 (noting that Department of the Navy v. Egan, 484 U.S. 518, 530 (1988), recognized 
“the reluctance of the courts ‘to intrude upon the authority of the Executive in military and national 
security affairs’”). 
51  Id. at 532 (quoting Kennedy v. Mendoza-Martinez, 372 U.S. 144, 165 (1963)); see also id. at 530 
(“[H]istory and common sense teach us that an unchecked system of detention carries the potential to 
become a means for oppression and abuse of others who do not present that sort of threat.”). 
52  Id. at 536. 
53  Id. at 577–78 (Scalia, J., dissenting). Justice Souter, joined by Justice Ginsburg, would have 
found Hamdi’s detention forbidden by § 4001(a) of the Non-Detention Act, but largely agreed with the 
plurality on the due process question, concerning the process that would be due if the detention were 
authorized. Id. at 553–54 (Souter, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part, and concurring in the 
judgment). 
54  Id. at 554–55 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
55  Id. at 577. 
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B. Rasul v. Bush 
In Rasul v. Bush,56 Justice Stevens wrote for five Justices, and Justice 
Scalia dissented for three.57 Justice Kennedy concurred in the judgment.58 
Hamdi was a U.S. citizen held in Virginia, but Rasul and his fellow 
petitioners were noncitizens held at Guantánamo Bay—brought there, in 
fact, for the purpose of preventing their access to federal courts.59 
DOJ argued, and Justice Scalia in dissent agreed, that the federal courts 
lacked jurisdiction over habeas claims by Guantánamo detainees.60 It 
bolstered this interpretation of the federal habeas statute with references to 
the grave constitutional concerns and military harm that would arise if the 
Court were to allow the detainees access to judicial protection.61 DOJ’s brief 
filed in Rumsfeld v. Padilla suggested that such harm included interference 
with the interrogation of detainees, which would follow from access to 
courts and lawyers.62 Although DOJ argued that Congress was better 
situated than the Court to consider the issue,63 it also suggested that 
Congress might be constitutionally barred from extending habeas 
jurisdiction to Guantánamo detainees.64 DOJ also asserted that the President 
had “conclusively determined” that Guantánamo detainees were not entitled 
to prisoner-of-war (POW) status under the Geneva Conventions.65 In the 
alternative, it suggested that the Court should decline to exercise 
jurisdiction based on the political question doctrine66 and sought to reassure 
the Court that its review was unnecessary: the Executive Branch voluntarily 
provided protections, and “diplomatic and political scrutiny” provided 
external checks.67 Counsel for Rasul agreed that some judicial deference to 
the Executive was appropriate, but noted that the Administration sought not 
 
56  542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
57  Id. at 488 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
58  Id. at 485 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment). 
59  Id. at 470–71 (majority opinion); see Memorandum from Patrick F. Philbin & John C. Yoo, 
Deputy Assistant Attorneys Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to William J. Haynes, II, Gen. Counsel, 
Dep’t of Def. (Dec. 28, 2001), in THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB 29, 29 (Karen J. 
Greenberg & Joshua L. Dratel eds., 2005) [hereinafter THE TORTURE PAPERS]. 
60  Brief for the Respondents at 10–11, Rasul, 542 U.S. 466 (Nos. 03-334, 03-343), 2004 WL 
425739, at *10–11. 
61  See id. at 41–43; id. at 42 (arguing that if the Court were to exercise jurisdiction it would 
“directly interfere with the Executive’s conduct of the military campaign against al Qaeda and its 
supporters”). 
62  Brief for the Petitioner at 29, Rumsfeld v. Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (2004) (No. 03-1027), 2004 WL 
542777, at *29. 
63  Brief for the Respondents, supra note 60, at 45–46. 
64  Id. at 45 (“To be sure, the Constitution would limit the ability of Congress to extend federal court 
jurisdiction into areas that interfered with the core executive responsibilities.”). 
65  Id. at 36. 
66  Id. at 37 & n.19. 
67  Id. at 47–50. 
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merely deference but absolute and exclusive executive control over the 
detainees.68 
Justice Stevens’s dense and technical majority opinion in Rasul lacked 
the kind of discussion found in Hamdi’s various opinions of the Judiciary’s 
role in safeguarding liberty and how best to weigh competing constitutional 
values. Focusing instead on dissecting complicated Court precedent—about 
which he had particular knowledge from his time as Justice Wiley 
Rutledge’s law clerk69—Justice Stevens held that the habeas statute 
afforded federal courts jurisdiction over the detainees in part because of the 
United States’ exclusive jurisdiction and control over the U.S. military base 
at Guantánamo Bay.70 The Court implicitly rejected, but did not expressly 
address, DOJ’s argument that the Court should accept the Department’s 
interpretation in order to avoid “directly interfer[ing] with the Executive’s 
conduct of the military campaign against al Qaeda and its supporters.”71 In a 
concurring opinion, Justice Kennedy expressed greater concern than the 
majority with the deference due the Executive, but agreed that on balance—
and in light of Guantánamo’s special status—the competing values of 
respect for the President’s military authority and the Court’s role in 
protecting against unlawful detention weighed in favor of habeas review.72 
C. Rumsfeld v. Padilla 
The Bush Administration’s only victory among the Court’s five 
detainee cases came in convincing the Court not to reach the merits in 
Rumsfeld v. Padilla,73 the third ruling issued on June 28, 2004. The 
government had seized Jose Padilla, a U.S. citizen, in Chicago on suspicion 
of conspiring to detonate a dirty bomb. After holding him for a month in 
New York, where he was allowed access to counsel, President Bush 
declared Padilla an “enemy combatant” and transferred him to military 
custody—specifically, a military brig in South Carolina where he was held 
for three and a half years, during most of which he was held in solitary 
 
68  Brief for Petitioners at 11, Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004) (Nos. 03-334, 03-343), 2004 WL 
96764, at *11 (“The courts should certainly pay considerable deference to the executive in times of 
crisis, and they have the wisdom and the experience to do so. But the government here is not asking for 
deference. It contends that the courts do not even have the authority to defer; that they lack 
jurisdiction . . . . The courts’ role may be limited in times of crisis, but they must have a role to play.”). 
69  See Thai, supra note 8 (describing the import of a dissent issued by Justice Rutledge while Justice 
Stevens served as his law clerk). 
70  Rasul, 542 U.S. at 580–84. 
71  Brief for the Respondents, supra note 60, at 42. The Court also signaled its view that the 
detainees would prevail on the merits of their claims if their allegations were true. See Rasul, 542 U.S. at 
483 n.15. 
72  Rasul, 542 U.S. at 487–88 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
73  542 U.S. 426 (2004). 
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confinement, interrogated, and denied access to counsel.74 Chief Justice 
Rehnquist, writing for the five-Justice majority (including Justice 
Kennedy), agreed with DOJ that Padilla erred by filing his habeas petition 
in the Southern District of New York rather than the District of South 
Carolina, and dismissed the suit.75 
In its alternative argument on the merits, which the Court did not 
address, DOJ again relied on the President’s detention authority that flowed 
from his constitutional authority as Commander in Chief and his statutory 
authority under the AUMF.76 It argued that the Court could review the 
President’s judgments “only in exceptionally narrow situations, if at all”77 
and emphasized that the President’s judgments resulted from “a careful, 
thorough, and deliberative process consisting of several layers of review.”78 
Counsel for the detainees responded that any argument for deference due 
the Executive with regard to “enemy combatants” detained on the 
battlefield was absent because Padilla was arrested in the United States.79 
Relevant to Hamdi and Rasul, as well as Padilla, the Administration 
expounded upon why it believed its policy of military detention without 
access to counsel was essential to effective military operations and national 
security. It defended military detention not only for the traditional purpose 
of preventing a return to the battlefield, which the Court recognized as 
legitimate in Hamdi,80 but also for the far more controversial purpose of 
facilitating interrogation by creating a sense of hopelessness and 
dependency on the interrogators. To explain its perceived need to deny 
counsel to Padilla, the government submitted a sworn declaration of Vice 
Admiral Lowell E. Jacoby, Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency, 
which stated: 
Only after such time as Padilla has perceived that help is not on the way can 
the United States reasonably expect to obtain all possible intelligence 
information from Padilla. . . . Providing him access to counsel now . . . would 
break—probably irreparably—the sense of dependency and trust that the 
 
74  See Abby Goodnough & Scott Shane, Padilla Is Guilty on All Charges in Terror Trial, N.Y. 
TIMES, Aug. 17, 2007, at A1 (noting Padilla’s three-and-a-half-year detention at a military brig); 
Deborah Sontag, A Videotape Offers a Window into a Terror Suspect’s Isolation, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 4, 
2006, at A1 (noting Padilla was denied counsel for twenty-one of those months). Former Attorney 
General Michael Mukasey, then the chief judge of the District Court for the Southern District of New 
York, ultimately rebuffed DOJ and granted Padilla access to counsel. Philip Shenon & Benjamin 
Weiser, Washington Outsider with Many Sides, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 18, 2007, at A1. 
75  Padilla, 542 U.S. at 442–47. 
76  Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 62, at 43–44. 
77  Id. at 43. 
78  Id. at 6. 
79  See Brief of Respondent at 43, Padilla, 542 U.S. 426 (No. 03-1027), 2004 WL 812830, at *43 
(“Any deference to executive judgment that might be appropriate in battlefield determinations is wholly 
absent here.”). 
80  See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 519 (2004) (plurality opinion). 
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interrogators are attempting to create.81 
The tone of Justice Stevens’s dissent for four Justices in Padilla differs 
strikingly from his majority opinion in Rasul. Freed of the need to achieve a 
majority, Justice Stevens wrote expansively and with passion about the 
Judiciary’s essential role in constraining the Executive in order to preserve 
“a free society,” even in the most challenging of circumstances.82 He 
decried detention without counsel for interrogation purposes as reminiscent 
of the Star Chamber and unlawful regardless of information procured.83 His 
stirring opinion merits quotation at length: 
 At stake in this case is nothing less than the essence of a free society. Even 
more important than the method of selecting the people’s rulers and their 
successors is the character of the constraints imposed on the Executive by the 
rule of law. Unconstrained executive detention for the purpose of investigating 
and preventing subversive activity is the hallmark of the Star Chamber. Access 
to counsel for the purpose of protecting the citizen from official mistakes and 
mistreatment is the hallmark of due process. 
 Executive detention of subversive citizens, like detention of enemy soldiers 
to keep them off the battlefield, may sometimes be justified to prevent persons 
from launching or becoming missiles of destruction. It may not, however, be 
justified by the naked interest in using unlawful procedures to extract 
information. Incommunicado detention for months on end is such a procedure. 
Whether the information so procured is more or less reliable than that acquired 
by more extreme forms of torture is of no consequence. For if this Nation is to 
remain true to the ideals symbolized by its flag, it must not wield the tools of 
tyrants even to resist an assault by the forces of tyranny.84 
Justice Stevens also addressed the merits of Padilla’s claims, writing in a 
footnote that he agreed with the Second Circuit that the “Non-Detention Act 
prohibits—and the [AUMF] does not authorize—the protracted, 
incommunicado detention of American citizens arrested in the United 
States.”85 
After holding Padilla for three and a half years as an “enemy 
combatant,” the government successfully avoided further Supreme Court 
review of the extremely difficult issues associated with applying that status 
to someone detained on U.S. soil by, at the eleventh hour, transferring 
Padilla out of military custody and trying him in a civilian court, on charges 
 
81  Brief of Respondent, supra note 79, at 3 n.3 (omissions in original) (quoting Jacoby’s 
declaration) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Brief for the Petitioner, supra note 62, at 10, 29 
(relying upon Jacoby’s declaration). 
82  Padilla, 542 U.S. at 465 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
83  Id. 
84  Id. (emphasis added) (footnote omitted). 
85  Id. at 464 n.8 (citations omitted). Justice Stevens thus disagreed with the Hamdi plurality on this 
point, which he did not reach in Hamdi. See supra note 48. 
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unrelated to the initial “dirty bomb” charge.86 After the transfer, the 
Supreme Court denied review of the legality of his military detention.87 
Three Justices dissented from the denial of certiorari.88 Justice Stevens, the 
natural fourth vote to grant review, instead joined an opinion by Justice 
Kennedy, which Chief Justice John Roberts also joined.89 Justice Kennedy’s 
opinion explained that they denied review because of the transfer but 
emphasized that the federal district court now “will be obliged to afford him 
the protection, including the right to a speedy trial, guaranteed to all federal 
criminal defendants” and that the court should respond promptly if the 
government sought to transfer Padilla again to military control.90 
Commentators speculated that Justice Stevens voted against taking the case 
because Justice Kennedy, the presumed deciding vote, believed review of 
the merits was premature and therefore the Court would lack five votes to 
resolve the merits in the way Justice Stevens believed appropriate.91 
 
86  Padilla v. Hanft, 547 U.S. 1062, 1063 (2006) (Kennedy, J., concurring in denial of certiorari); see 
also Goodnough & Shane, supra note 74, at A21 (“After being held in isolation in a military brig in 
South Carolina for three and a half years, Mr. Padilla . . . was transferred to civilian custody here last 
year after the Supreme Court considered taking up his case.”). 
87  The Fourth Circuit, which had held that Padilla’s military detention was within the President’s 
authority, Padilla v. Hanft, 423 F.3d 386, 397 (4th Cir. 2005), denied DOJ’s requests to vacate that 
decision and authorize the transfer due to “at least an appearance that the government may be attempting 
to avoid consideration of our decision by the Supreme Court.” Padilla v. Hanft, 432 F.3d 582, 583 (4th 
Cir. 2005). The Supreme Court granted the application for transfer, Hanft v. Padilla, 546 U.S. 1084 
(2006), and subsequently denied certiorari, Padilla v. Hanft, 547 U.S. 1062 (2006). 
88  Padilla, 547 U.S. at 1064 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting from denial of certiorari) (“This case, here for 
the second time, raises a question ‘of profound importance to the Nation[]’ . . . .” (quoting Padilla, 542 
U.S. at 455 (Stevens, J., dissenting))). 
89  Id. at 1063–64 (Kennedy, J., concurring in denial of certiorari). 
90  Id. at 1064. The opinion also noted that in the future Padilla could seek a writ of habeas corpus 
from the Court in an original action and cited the applicable Supreme Court rule. Id. 
91  See, e.g., Marty Lederman, Reading Padilla’s Tea Leaves, SCOTUSBLOG (Apr. 3, 2006, 11:01 
AM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2006/04/reading-padillas-tea-leaves. Padilla’s story continued. Padilla 
was convicted and sentenced to more than seventeen years. Kirk Semple, Padilla Gets 17-Year Term for 
Role in Conspiracy, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 23, 2008, at A14. Federal district court Judge Marcia Cooke 
found, in part, that the conditions of Padilla’s detention and interrogation had been “harsh” and that this 
finding “warrant[ed] consideration in the sentencing.” Id. (internal quotation marks omitted). The 
government challenged the sentence as inadequate and on appeal a divided three-judge panel of the 
Eleventh Circuit vacated the sentence. See United States v. Jayyousi, 657 F.3d 1085, 1118–19 (11th Cir. 
2011). The majority agreed that harsh conditions of pretrial detention may justify a downward departure 
but held that the district court had abused its discretion by “attach[ing] little weight to Padilla’s 
extensive criminal history, [giving] no weight to his future dangerousness, compar[ing] him to criminals 
who were not similarly situated, and [giving] unreasonable weight to the conditions of his pre-trial 
confinement.” Id. at 1119. Separately, a unanimous panel of the Fourth Circuit affirmed a district court’s 
dismissal of Padilla’s Bivens suit against former Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld and others for 
alleged infringements of his constitutional rights. See Lebron v. Rumsfeld, 670 F.3d 540 (4th Cir. 2012), 
aff’g 764 F. Supp. 2d 787 (D.S.C. 2011), cert. denied, 80 U.S.L.W. 3676 (U.S. June 11, 2012) (No. 11-
1277). The court found that “[s]pecial factors do counsel judicial hesitation in implying causes of action 
for enemy combatants held in military detention.” Id. at 548. But see Stephen I. Vladeck, National 
Security and Bivens After Iqbal, 14 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 255 (2010) (arguing a Bivens remedy is 
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D. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld 
Two years later, on June 29, 2006, Justice Stevens wrote for a five-
Justice majority in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld.92 In an unusually long and 
complex opinion focused on technical statutory interpretation rather than 
constitutional principles, the Court held unlawful the Bush Administration’s 
system of military commissions established outside of civilian federal 
courts for the trial of certain noncitizens “for violations of the laws of war 
and other applicable laws.”93 DOJ’s brief in support urged strong deference: 
“Because the Military Order applies to alien enemy combatants who are 
captured during the ongoing war with al Qaeda, both the traditional 
deference this Court pays to the military justice system and the vital role 
played by that system are at their pinnacle.”94 As usual, DOJ urged the 
Court to dismiss the case and not reach the merits. The Detainee Treatment 
Act of 2005 (DTA), it argued, removed the Court’s jurisdiction, and even if 
it did not, precedent required the Court to abstain until the final outcome of 
Hamdan’s military commission process.95 
On the merits, DOJ cited as authorization for the commissions the 
DTA, the AUMF, the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), and the 
President’s inherent constitutional authority.96 Regarding detainees’ claims 
under international law, it argued that the President’s determination that the 
Geneva Conventions did not apply to the conflict with al Qaeda (and 
therefore did not protect Salim Hamdan) was “binding on the courts”—or, 
if not binding, the standard of review at a minimum “would surely be 
extraordinarily deferential to the President.”97 
Three Justices joined two dissenting opinions that would have upheld 
the commissions. Chief Justice Roberts presumably would have provided a 
fourth dissenting vote. He recused himself because as a judge on the D.C. 
Circuit just days before President Bush nominated him to the Supreme 
 
appropriate and that special factors of the kind the Lebron court considered are better addressed by 
qualified immunity and state secrets doctrines). 
92  548 U.S. 557 (2006). 
93  Military Order of Nov. 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment and Trial of Certain Non-Citizens in the 
War Against Terrorism, 3 C.F.R. § 918 (2002). 
94  See Brief for Respondents at 13, Hamdan, 548 U.S. 557 (No. 05-184), 2006 WL 460875, at *13. 
95  See id. at 7, 15–16. 
96  Id. at 15–23. To Hamdan’s argument that the military commissions were not “necessary” and 
thus not authorized under the AUMF, the Administration responded: “This Court has recognized that 
courts are not competent to second-guess judgments of the political branches regarding the extent of 
force necessary to prosecute a war.” Id. at 19. 
97  Id. at 38. President Bush issued a memorandum stating, “I also accept the legal conclusion of the 
Department of Justice and determine that common Article 3 of Geneva does not apply to either al Qaeda 
or Taliban detainees, because, among other reasons, the relevant conflicts are international in scope and 
common Article 3 applies only to ‘armed conflict not of an international character.’” Memorandum from 
President George W. Bush for the Vice President et al., Humane Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban 
Detainees (Feb. 7, 2002), in THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 59, at 134, 134–35. 
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Court, he joined the very opinion upholding military commissions that the 
Court reversed in Hamdan.98 The D.C. Circuit had deferred to the 
President’s view of Common Article 3, concluding that “the President’s 
reasonable view of the provision must . . . prevail” in resolving ambiguity 
in its meaning.99 Justice Thomas, joined by Justice Scalia, essentially agreed 
with the D.C. Circuit. He wrote that the majority “without acknowledging 
its duty to defer to the President, adopts its own, admittedly plausible, 
reading of Common Article 3,”100 and “its opinion openly flouts our well-
established duty to respect the Executive’s judgment in matters of military 
operations and foreign affairs.”101 Justice Scalia authored a second dissent, 
joined by Justices Thomas and Alito, which found that the DTA denied the 
Court jurisdiction and in any event the Court should have abstained.102 
On both the question of jurisdiction and the merits, Justice Stevens’s 
opinion for the Court is striking for its refusal to abstain or give significant 
consideration to the issue of deference. The Court held that the DTA did not 
deprive the Court of jurisdiction and found DOJ “has identified no other 
‘important countervailing interest’” to justify abstention.103 On the merits, 
the Court found no need to reach the question of the President’s 
constitutional authority to convene military commissions in the absence of 
congressional authorization: the UCMJ allowed for the establishment of 
military commissions but required compliance with certain specified 
procedures as well as with the laws of war104—which the Bush system failed 
to do. Specifically, the Court found that the UCMJ required the same 
procedures used in courts martial “insofar as practicable” as well as the 
procedures required under Common Article 3, including a “regularly 
constituted court affording all the judicial guarantees which are recognized 
as indispensable by civilized peoples.”105 
Two aspects of the Court’s ruling merit special note for their effects 
beyond military commissions. First, the Court’s only consideration of 
deference was as applied to President Bush’s determination that it was 
impracticable to apply to Hamdan’s military commission the rules and 
principles of law governing criminal trials in federal courts.106 The Court 
 
98  Linda Greenhouse, Detainee Case Will Pose Delicate Question for Court, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 
2006, at A12. 
99  Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 415 F.3d 33, 42 (D.C. Cir. 2005), rev’d 548 U.S. 557; see also id. at 44 
(Williams, J., concurring) (concluding that Common Article 3 does apply to al Qaeda members captured 
in Afghanistan but that the Geneva Convention is “not enforceable in courts of the United States”). 
100  Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 719 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
101  Id. at 678. 
102  Id. at 655 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
103  Id. at 589 (majority opinion) (quoting Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 716 
(1996)). 
104  Id. at 592–94. 
105  Id. at 620, 630 (internal quotation mark omitted). 
106  See id. at 623. 
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declined to defer to the President’s decision not to use the rules for courts 
martial, holding that the President had failed to make the required 
determination that it was impracticable to do so and citing to Justice 
Kennedy’s discussion of the difference in wording of the two 
requirements.107 Even more striking, the Court without comment declined to 
defer to (let alone accept as binding) the President’s interpretation of 
Common Article 3. The Court instead found to the contrary that Common 
Article 3 applied to the conflict with al Qaeda, with implications 
devastating not only for President Bush’s military commissions, but also for 
his “enhanced interrogation” policies that clearly did not comply with 
Common Article 3.108 
Second, the Court pointedly noted (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube 
Co. v. Sawyer) that the President “may not disregard limitations that 
Congress has, in proper exercise of its own war powers, placed on his 
powers,” and that “[t]he Government does not argue otherwise.”109 The 
Court, of course, knew that the Bush Administration in fact had argued 
otherwise in other contexts, in support of claims of presidential authority to 
disregard (or reinterpret) several other statutory limits on its 
counterterrorism and war policies.110 While Justice Stevens limited the 
comment to a footnote, Justice Kennedy’s concurrence quoted approvingly 
the entirety of Justice Robert Jackson’s famous three-part scheme in his 
Youngstown concurrence, highlighting that to the extent President Bush’s 
military commissions did not comply with the UCMJ, they fell in zone 
three where “his power is at its lowest ebb.”111 Justice Kennedy expounded 
on the harms of presidential unilateralism and the “stability in time of 
crisis” provided by statutes enacted as “the result of a deliberative and 
reflective process engaging both of the political branches.”112 
Justice Stevens lost Justice Kennedy and thus the majority on one 
major issue: Justice Kennedy found it unnecessary to reach whether the 
specific charge of conspiracy against Hamdan was an offense against the 
laws of war cognizable by military commission.113 Also, although Justice 
Kennedy agreed that Common Article 3 applied to the commissions, he 
would not have gone as far as the plurality in finding specific procedural 
 
107  Id. at 622–24. Even assuming that President Bush’s determination “would be entitled to a 
measure of deference,” “the only reason offered . . . is the danger posed by international terrorism” but 
the record provided no specific reason for thinking standard court-martial procedures would not work. 
Id. at 623 & n.51. 
108  Id. at 629–33; see infra note 223 and accompanying text. 
109  Id. at 593 n.23 (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) 
(Jackson, J., concurring)). 
110  See infra Part III.A. 
111  Hamdan, 548 U.S. at 638 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (quoting Youngstown, 343 U.S. at 637) 
(internal quotation mark omitted). 
112  Id. at 637. 
113  Id. at 655. 
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guarantees applicable.114 Justice Stevens declined to join a short 
concurrence by Justice Breyer for four Justices (including Justice Kennedy) 
that emphasized the President remained free to ask Congress to amend the 
statutory requirements and give him the authority he believed he needed.115 
President Bush promptly did so and, in direct response to Hamdan, 
Congress enacted the Military Commissions Act of 2006 (MCA). 
E. Boumediene v. Bush 
In the Supreme Court’s last opinion to date on the rights of the 
Guantánamo detainees, Boumediene v. Bush,116 the Court for the first time 
disagreed with both the President and Congress. Also for the first time, 
Justice Stevens did not write an opinion; he joined Justice Kennedy’s 
majority opinion for five Justices, which held that in enacting the MCA, 
Congress unconstitutionally deprived the detainees of habeas review 
without providing an adequate alternative. Justice Stevens initially had 
voted with Justice Kennedy to deny certiorari.117 After the experience of 
losing the majority in Padilla, Justice Stevens apparently made the strategic 
decision to wait to grant certiorari until Justice Kennedy agreed that review 
was desirable, and then allowed him to write the opinion, in recognition of 
his key position at the center of the Court on 9/11 detainee issues.118 
Chief Justice Roberts wrote a dissenting opinion for four Justices. He 
agreed with DOJ that the Court should abstain from reaching the merits of 
this “grossly premature” constitutional challenge and instead required the 
detainees to exhaust remedies provided under the DTA that permitted 
limited review of “enemy combatant” status.119 On the merits, the dissenters 
found the DTA procedures constitutionally adequate.120 In a second dissent 
also for four Justices, Justice Scalia noted that DOJ’s Office of Legal 
Counsel (OLC) had advised President Bush that the federal courts could not 
exercise habeas jurisdiction over the Guantánamo detainees; Justice Scalia 
accused the Court of a “game of bait-and-switch” with “the Nation’s 
 
114  Id. at 654. 
115  Id. at 636 (Breyer, J., concurring). 
116  553 U.S. 723 (2008). 
117  Boumediene v. Bush, 549 U.S. 1328, 1328–29 (2007) (denying certiorari). 
118  Professor Richard Fallon succinctly explained, 
Alone among his colleagues, Justice Kennedy has voted with the majority in every single habeas 
case stemming from the War on Terror. Justice Stevens may have signaled his recognition of 
Justice Kennedy’s outcome-controlling influence when he declined to join three “liberal” 
colleagues in voting to grant certiorari in the Boumediene case as long as Justice Kennedy 
opposed a grant. Then, when Justice Kennedy changed his mind, Justice Stevens shifted his vote 
too, possibly in anticipation that Kennedy would ally himself with the Court’s four liberals . . . . 
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., The Supreme Court, Habeas Corpus, and the War on Terror: An Essay on Law 
and Political Science, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 352, 376 (2010) (footnotes omitted). 
119  Boumediene, 553 U.S. at 801, 804 (Roberts, C.J., dissenting). 
120  Id. at 808. 
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Commander in Chief” that “will almost certainly cause more Americans to 
be killed.”121 
The Court’s majority found further delay unwarranted, given the 
Court’s central role in upholding the Constitution against political branch 
violations and the fact that the detainees already had been imprisoned for 
years without judicial review.122 Unlike the statutory provision at issue in 
Hamdan, a provision of the MCA enacted in response to Hamdan 
unambiguously denied the federal courts jurisdiction to hear habeas corpus 
actions pending at the time of enactment.123 The Court therefore reached the 
constitutional challenge and held that the Constitution’s Suspension Clause 
applied to the Guantánamo detainees and that Congress had not provided a 
constitutionally adequate substitute for habeas review.124 
The process by which the Court decided to review Boumediene 
exemplifies the central roles of Justices Stevens and Kennedy in the 
detainee cases—and the centrality as well of the flawed nature of the Bush 
Administration’s policies. When both Justices initially voted to deny 
certiorari, they issued a jointly signed statement saying that review was 
premature but that the Court would remain open to a renewed appeal if 
circumstances warranted it.125 A few months later, Boumediene’s lawyer 
filed a remarkable motion for reconsideration attaching an affidavit from an 
army officer, Stephen Abramson, who had been a member of a military 
review board making individual detention determinations. Abramson 
reported that the process was badly flawed; commanding officers, for 
example, pressed officers on the boards to decide in favor of detention.126 
The Court responded with an unusual grant of certiorari just months after a 
denial, suggesting that Justice Kennedy changed his mind in light of the 
Abramson statement, and that Justice Stevens strategically waited for 
Justice Kennedy and later assigned him the majority opinion.127 
As is apparent from this review of the Court’s detainee cases, Justice 
Stevens led the Court in upholding detainees’ rights by authoring key 
opinions and building majorities in support of a strong judicial check on 
 
121  Id. at 827–28 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
122  Id. at 765, 772–73; see also id. at 771 (“This Court may not impose a de facto suspension by 
abstaining from these controversies.”). 
123  Id. at 738–39. 
124  Id. at 787–92. 
125  Boumediene v. Bush, 549 U.S. 1328, 1329 (2007) (Stevens & Kennedy, JJ., respecting denial of 
certiorari). 
126  William Glaberson, In Shift, Justices Agree to Review Detainees’ Case, N.Y. TIMES, June 30, 
2007, at A1. 
127  Id. Court reporter Linda Greenhouse wrote of Justice Stevens’s vote, “The most plausible 
explanation is that this canny tactician and strategist, who had managed to win Justice Kennedy’s vote 
for his two earlier Guantánamo opinions, knew better than to risk losing that support by pushing his 
colleague too far, too fast.” Linda Greenhouse, Clues to the New Dynamic on the Supreme Court, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 3, 2007, at A11. 
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presidential overreaching. Equally clear, Justice Stevens needed Justice 
Kennedy—the only Justice who has voted with the majority in every 
detainee case.128 Justice Kennedy, more than Justice Stevens, was willing to 
avoid reaching the merits and to defer to the Executive on the merits: he 
joined the Hamdi plurality’s less liberty-protective approach; wrote 
separately in Rasul to emphasize the deference due the Executive; provided 
a necessary fifth vote to dismiss in Padilla from which Justice Stevens 
passionately dissented; concurred in Hamdan to limit its holding; and 
initially voted against certiorari in Boumediene—as did Justice Stevens, 
until Justice Kennedy was willing to hear the case. In the end, Justice 
Kennedy rejected the government’s arguments and ruled for the detainees in 
four out of five cases. After Justice Stevens’s retirement, Justice Kennedy 
likely remains an essential vote for upholding contested rights of the 
Guantánamo detainees and constraining unlawful executive action amid the 
pressures of war and threats to national security. 
II. TOWARD A BALANCED APPROACH TO FOREIGN AFFAIRS DEFERENCE 
The Supreme Court’s 9/11 detainee decisions inspired extensive and 
varied academic commentary, much of which addresses the role of the 
federal judiciary vis-à-vis the Executive and the appropriate level of 
deference due the Executive on matters of foreign affairs. Some 
commentators celebrate the Court’s willingness to stand up to the Executive 
Branch and safeguard the rule of law; others express grave concern about 
the harmful, even horrific consequences they fear might follow the Court’s 
overreaching. Among those who agree that the Court was right to find the 
challenged policies unlawful, some nonetheless question the Court’s failure 
to address deference. 
Justice Stevens is featured not only for his lead role in the detainee 
cases, but also for what may seem a contradictory pro-deference position 
for the unanimous Court in Chevron, the landmark 1984 ruling that 
established standards affording considerable judicial deference to certain 
executive interpretations of statutes.129 As discussed, the detainee cases 
turned in part on whether the Court would defer to the Executive Branch’s 
controversial interpretations of various statutory and treaty provisions: the 
2001 Authorization to Use Military Force (AUMF), the Uniform Code of 
Military Justice (UCMJ), the Detainee Treatment Act (DTA), the Non-
Detention Act, the federal habeas statute, and provisions of the Geneva 
Conventions, especially Common Article 3. A recurring subject of 
commentary considers Chevron’s relevance in the foreign affairs context: 
whether and under what circumstances the Court should afford Chevron-
 
128  See supra note 118. 
129  Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837 (1984). 
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like deference to the Executive Branch’s interpretations of federal statutory 
and treaty provisions that involve foreign affairs.130 
The recent flurry of scholarship, rich in descriptive and normative 
analysis, contrasts with the Court’s longstanding inattention to the 
theoretical basis for foreign relations deference. As Professor Curtis 
Bradley observed, writing before 9/11: “In most of its deference decisions, 
the Supreme Court has simply assumed, or has asserted in a conclusory 
fashion, that foreign affairs should in fact make a difference.”131 Bradley 
cited the often quoted 1936 Curtiss-Wright decision as the rare exception.132 
The Court’s post-9/11 opinions, although enormously consequential in their 
rejection of both strong deference and the President’s policies, provided 
remarkably little additional guidance about the nature of foreign affairs 
deference. Most instructive is the Hamdi plurality’s discussion of the 
judiciary’s essential role in protecting individual liberty against the power 
of the Executive even during wartime.133 
Hamdan, at the other extreme, barely acknowledged the issue. The 
Court purported to rely on a relatively straightforward application of legal 
requirements that President Bush’s commissions failed to meet.134 Many 
commentators, however, have argued persuasively that the relevant 
statutory and treaty provisions were not so unambiguous, and that 
something more must have motivated the Court’s interpretation.135 One 
illustration of the Court’s generally undertheorized approach to foreign 
affairs deference is, as Professor Robert Chesney observed, the 
juxtaposition of Hamdan’s “fail[ure] even to mention the deference 
doctrine” in construing the Geneva Conventions, against the Court’s 
invocation of treaty deference in another decision issued just one day 
 
130  For a thorough assessment of the related question of appropriate judicial deference to the 
Executive Branch’s factual judgments on national security matters, see Robert M. Chesney, National 
Security Fact Deference, 95 VA. L. REV. 1361 (2009). 
131  Bradley, supra note 27, at 663. 
132  Id. at 663–64 (“But in a few instances—most notably in its 1936 Curtiss-Wright decision—it has 
attempted an explanation.”). 
133  See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004) (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion). As 
discussed in Part I of this Article, several other opinions in the Court’s detainee cases also addressed the 
issue of wartime deference to the Executive when individual liberty is at stake. 
134  See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 575–76 (2006) (“Ordinary principles of statutory 
construction suffice to rebut the Government’s theory . . . .”). 
135  This is true even of commentators who generally praise Hamdan. See, e.g., Deborah Pearlstein, 
Justice Stevens and the Expert Executive, 99 GEO. L.J. 1301, 1304–05 (2011). 
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earlier.136 Chesney concluded that “the deference doctrine appears more 
unsettled and indeterminate than ever before.”137 
Given this vacuum, some deference proponents look to Justice 
Stevens’s Chevron opinion, which, in a wholly domestic context, addressed 
both the mechanics of, and justifications for, judicial deference to executive 
agency statutory interpretations. In the course of upholding an 
Environmental Protection Agency interpretation of the Clean Air Act, the 
Chevron Court articulated a two-step test for judicial review of certain 
executive agency interpretations of statutes they administer.138 First, the 
court considers whether Congress has spoken clearly to the issue, and if so, 
the court (and the agency) must give effect to that intent.139 If Congress was 
silent or its intent was ambiguous, step two directs the court to defer to a 
reasonable construction of the statute by the administering agency, even if 
the court would have preferred a different interpretation.140 
The Chevron Court explained the justifications for deference in terms 
of functionalism and democratic theory: “Judges are not experts in the field, 
and are not part of either political branch of the Government,”141 while the 
administering agencies possess superior expertise and political 
accountability by virtue of serving an elected President. Chevron rests 
further on a theory of delegation: Congress is assumed to have delegated 
resolution of the ambiguous question to the expert agency. As 
commentators have noted, this assumption is based on a fiction because 
Congress typically does not consider the question of who will fill gaps with 
regard to a particular statute.142 The assumption is that Congress would 
prefer the gap be filled based on the policy judgments of the administering 
agency, given its expertise and location within a branch of government 
headed by an elected president, rather than by a reviewing court.143 
 
136  Robert M. Chesney, Disaggregating Deference: The Judicial Power and Executive Treaty 
Interpretations, 92 IOWA L. REV. 1723, 1732–33 (2007) (“[T]he Court had expressly invoked the 
deference doctrine just one day before it issued Hamdan, in Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon . . . . By failing 
even to mention the deference doctrine the next day in Hamdan, the Court ensured that questions would 
arise as to the doctrine’s scope and significance.” (footnote omitted)). 
137  Id. at 1727; see also id. at 1734–35 (“[T]he details of the methodology are not entirely certain, 
and there is considerable room for debate regarding the extent to which courts are obliged to or 
consistently do follow it.”). 
138  Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). 
139  Id. at 842–43. 
140  Id. at 843. 
141  Id. at 865. 
142  See, e.g., David Barron & Elena Kagan, Chevron’s Nondelegation Doctrine, 2001 SUP. CT. REV. 
201, 203 (arguing that “some version of constructive—or perhaps more frankly said, fictional—intent 
must operate in judicial efforts to delineate the scope of Chevron” and “this construction should arise 
from and reflect candid policy judgments”). 
143  The Court explained in Chevron: 
Courts must, in some cases, reconcile competing political interests, but not on the basis of the 
judges’ personal policy preferences. In contrast, an agency to which Congress has delegated 
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Congress retains full authority to clarify the reach and meaning of the law 
through subsequent legislation. 
In his 2000 article, Chevron Deference and Foreign Affairs, Professor 
Bradley suggested insights to be gained from the application of Chevron’s 
perspective to the foreign affairs context. In his view, Chevron aids in 
developing a path between two imperfect extremes: near-absolute Curtiss-
Wright deference, on the one hand, and the inadequate respect for the 
Executive’s expertise and constitutional role advocated by Professor Harold 
Koh and other Curtiss-Wright critics, on the other.144 Bradley’s illustrative 
applications leaned toward relatively strong deference, but his prescriptions 
depended on the context. He also emphasized his limited objective: he 
sought not to set forth a completely developed alternative approach, but “to 
suggest a different way of thinking about the deference issue—one that 
sheds new light on the question and at least begins to point the way to a 
better approach.”145 Bradley was writing a year before 9/11 and thus in a 
context devoid of issues specific to the terrorist attacks and the Bush 
Administration’s responses. 
Although some lower courts afforded strong deference to the Bush 
Administration’s policies, the Supreme Court, in reversing those decisions 
and finding the policies unlawful, adopted neither traditional strong 
deference nor a modified Chevron deference to the Executive. Hamdan’s 
rejection of the Bush Administration’s system of military commissions left 
Congress with the last say on the issue, as Chevron typically does (as long 
as Congress comports with constitutional limitations). By not deferring, 
however, the Hamdan Court in effect reversed the Chevron presumption by 
requiring the Executive to go to Congress to attain desired policies—which 
President Bush did after Hamdan—rather than allowing the Executive to 
act while leaving Congress the authority to undo unwanted executive 
policies, as in Chevron.146 
 
policymaking responsibilities may, within the limits of that delegation, properly rely upon the 
incumbent administration’s views of wise policy to inform its judgments. While agencies are not 
directly accountable to the people, the Chief Executive is, and it is entirely appropriate for this 
political branch of the Government to make such policy choices—resolving the competing 
interests which Congress itself either inadvertently did not resolve, or intentionally left to be 
resolved by the agency charged with the administration of the statute in light of everyday realities. 
 When a challenge to an agency construction of a statutory provision, fairly conceptualized, 
really centers on the wisdom of the agency’s policy, rather than whether it is a reasonable choice 
within a gap left open by Congress, the challenge must fail. In such a case, federal judges—who 
have no constituency—have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices made by those who do. 
Chevron, 467 U.S. at 865–66. 
144  Bradley, supra note 27, at 650; see also supra text accompanying notes 27–31. 
145  Bradley, supra note 27, at 667. 
146  Hamdan’s lawyer, Professor Neal Katyal, described seeking to persuade the Court that the 
default rule should be against the government because a decision in the President’s favor could not be 
easily overcome by Congress given the presidential veto. Neal Kumar Katyal, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: 
The Legal Academy Goes to Practice, 120 HARV. L. REV. 65, 94–95 (2006). 
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Professor Cass Sunstein is prominent among post-9/11 commentators 
who call for Chevron-like foreign affairs deference; he also is renowned for 
his scholarship on Chevron in its original domestic context and for his 
general advocacy of judicial minimalism. Sunstein argues for a strong 
version of Chevron deference to the Executive’s interpretations of 
ambiguities in the AUMF, except where constitutionally protected interests 
are at stake: “[T]he President receives the kind of super-strong deference 
that derives from the combination of Chevron with what are plausibly taken 
to be his constitutional responsibilities.”147 Sunstein proposed this standard 
in response to a 2005 article in the Harvard Law Review coauthored by 
Professor Bradley and Professor Jack Goldsmith, after both returned to 
academia following service in the Bush Administration.148 Bradley and 
Goldsmith’s ambitious article developed a framework for interpreting the 
AUMF and tackled some of the most difficult questions that arise in its 
application,149 including with respect to military detention and military 
commissions.150 On issues of deference, the authors notably did not repeat 
Bradley’s pre-9/11 call for Chevron deference or any particular measure of 
deference to the Executive’s interpretations, expressly leaving that open,151 
while urging respect for longstanding executive practice and the law of war 
in interpreting the AUMF.152 Professor Sunstein laments their omission of 
Chevron and calls for greater emphasis on administrative law deference 
principles and less on the law of war.153 
 
147  Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative Law Goes to War, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2663, 2671 (2005) 
[hereinafter Sunstein, Administrative Law Goes to War]; see Cass R. Sunstein, Minimalism at War, 
2004 SUP. CT. REV. 47, 50 [hereinafter Sunstein, Minimalism at War]. 
148  Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Congressional Authorization and the War on Terrorism, 
118 HARV. L. REV. 2047 (2005). Curtis Bradley spent 2004 working in the State Department’s Legal 
Adviser’s Office. Curtis A. Bradley, DUKE L. FAC., http://www.law.duke.edu/fac/bradleyc (last visited 
May 18, 2012). Jack Goldsmith served from 2002 to 2004, first as Special Counsel to the Defense 
Department’s General Counsel and then as the Assistant Attorney General heading the Office of Legal 
Counsel. JACK GOLDSMITH, http://www.jackgoldsmith.org (last visited May 18, 2012). 
149  Their approach notably tempers that taken by the Administration they both recently served. But 
among the key Bush Administration interpretations they support is the view that Common Article 3 of 
the Geneva Conventions does not apply to the conflict with al Qaeda, a position the Court later rejected 
in Hamdan. See Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 148, at 2115 n.304. 
150  Justice Stevens’s majority opinion in Hamdan cited the Bradley and Goldsmith article for its 
detailed review of the law governing military commissions. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 
595 (2006). 
151  Although they set forth a framework for interpreting the AUMF, they relegated the possibility of 
deference to the Bush Administration to a footnote and declared it beyond the scope of the article. See 
Bradley & Goldsmith, supra note 148, at 2084 n.150, 2107. 
152  See id. at 2085–2100. 
153  Sunstein, Administrative Law Goes to War, supra note 147, at 2664. For two additional valuable 
perspectives published in the same issue, see Ryan Goodman & Derek Jinks, International Law, U.S. 
War Powers, and the Global War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2653 (2005); Mark Tushnet, 
Controlling Executive Power in the War on Terrorism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2673 (2005). Bradley and 
Goldsmith replied to all three responses in Curtis A. Bradley & Jack L. Goldsmith, Rejoinder: The War 
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Sunstein continued in this vein in a 2007 Yale Law Journal debate with 
a provocative article coauthored with Eric Posner, Chevronizing Foreign 
Relations Law, that advocated, for foreign relations matters, expanding 
Chevron deference substantially beyond Chevron.154 Posner and Sunstein’s 
call for strong deference, even to executive interpretations that conflict with 
international law, came at a time of growing public attention to the Bush 
Administration’s claims of sweeping executive powers, including the power 
to act contrary to domestic and international law. Salim Hamdan’s 
victorious counsel Neal Katyal and his coauthor Derek Jinks responded 
with Disregarding Foreign Relations Law, which detailed the undesirable 
“radical implications” of allowing the Executive essentially to disregard 
international law aimed at constraining executive action.155 Writing 
separately elsewhere, Professor Katyal called for bureaucratic expertise to 
play a strong role in deference analysis and also for transferring core Office 
of Legal Counsel functions to a new “Director of Adjudication” insulated 
from political influences through removal protections.156 
Sharp differences clearly persist, but fundamental points of near 
consensus also emerge. Few commentators continue to defend absolute (or 
near-absolute) deference of the kind described in Curtiss-Wright or initially 
claimed by the Bush Administration. Most, including counsel for detainees, 
acknowledge that the Executive’s functional advantages and Article II 
authorities support some form of foreign affairs deference in some 
circumstances. Consensus also recognizes that, analogous to Chevron, 
competing imperatives include appropriate respect for executive expertise 
and political accountability on the one hand, and preservation of the rule of 
law and individual rights through judicially enforced constraints on 
unlawful executive action on the other. 
The substantial variations within this broad, evolving middle ground is 
unsurprising, especially in light of similar indeterminacy and controversy 
around Chevron in its domestic context.157 Justice Stevens has remarked that 
 
on Terrorism: International Law, Clear Statement Requirements, and Constitutional Design, 118 HARV. 
L. REV. 2683 (2005). 
154  See Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 
1170 (2007). Sunstein and Posner acknowledged that Chevron in the domestic context calls only for 
deference to agencies’ reasonable interpretations of certain types of statutes in some circumstances 
(including interpretations adopted by agencies exercising delegated authority to make rules or conduct 
adjudications), but they suggested dispensing with some of these limitations in the foreign affairs 
context. See id. at 1195–97, 1210–15; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Clear Statement Principles and 
National Security: Hamdan and Beyond, 2006 SUP. CT. REV. 1. 
155  Derek Jinks & Neal Kumar Katyal, Disregarding Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1230, 
1233–34, 1245 (2007) (quoting Posner & Sunstein, supra note 154, at 1177). 
156  See Neal Kumar Katyal, Internal Separation of Powers: Checking Today’s Most Dangerous 
Branch from Within, 115 YALE L.J. 2314, 2337 (2006); Katyal, supra note 146, at 115. 
157  See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, The Story of Chevron: The Making of an Accidental Landmark, in 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW STORIES 399, 426 (Peter L. Strauss ed., 2006) (“The much-debated question 
whether Chevron has had any impact on the degree of deference judges actually give to agencies 
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when he wrote Chevron, he intended simply to restate established law.158 
Indeed, he wrote for a unanimous Court.159 But in the decades since, as 
Chevron became a landmark decision, the Court has divided closely and 
acrimoniously over how best to apply it.160 Justices Stevens and Scalia often 
fell on opposite sides of key Chevron domestic issues, as they did on the 
rights of noncitizen detainees and the deference due the Executive on 
foreign affairs issues. Just three years after Chevron, Justice Scalia declared 
that the Court had “eviscerated” Chevron, in a case in which Justice Stevens 
wrote for a five-Justice majority.161 Thus began a decades-long argument 
about the role of legislative history in determining the existence of statutory 
ambiguity.162 Since 2000, the Court has denied agencies Chevron deference 
in several high-profile domestic cases, with Justice Stevens and Justice 
Scalia on opposing sides. The Court has declined to defer to the 
 
remains unresolved.”); Deborah N. Pearlstein, After Deference: Formalizing the Judicial Power for 
Foreign Relations Law, 159 U. PA. L. REV. 783, 810 (2011) (“It is perhaps more than a little ironic that 
Chevron has gained interest from foreign relations scholars at the same time that scholars of 
administrative law have been demonstrating with increasing persuasiveness how limited the impact of 
Chevron has been in cases reviewing agency statutory interpretations.”); id. at 810–817 (summarizing 
Court cases limiting Chevron and citing academic commentary). See generally William N. Eskridge, Jr. 
& Lauren E. Baer, The Continuum of Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory 
Interpretations from Chevron to Hamdan, 96 GEO. L.J. 1083, 1090 (2008) (noting that the Court gave 
Chevron deference in only 8.3% of agency statutory interpretation cases from 1984 to 2005). 
158  See Negusie v. Holder, 555 U.S. 511, 529 (2009) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting 
in part) (“Judicial deference to agencies’ views on statutes they administer was not born in 
Chevron . . . .”); Merrill, supra note 157, at 420 & n.76; see also Kathryn A. Watts, From Chevron to 
Massachusetts: Justice Stevens’s Approach to Securing the Public Interest, 43 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1021, 
1022 (2010) (“Justice Stevens seeks to effectuate Congress’s own animating goals, paying particularly 
close attention to Congress’s protective and remedial purposes. . . . [H]is purposivist approach to 
statutory interpretation often enables him to give agencies the leeway they need to achieve Congress’s 
broad protective or remedial goals and conversely to check agencies when they act counter to 
Congress’s purposes.”). 
159  Although Chevron was unanimous, only six Justices took part. See Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. 
NRDC, 467 U.S. 837, 866 (1984) (noting that Justices Marshall, Rehnquist, and O’Connor did not take 
part). 
160  Professor Thomas Merrill provided an interesting analysis of how Chevron achieved landmark 
status, which he attributed to two factors: the ascendency of its approach first on the D.C. Circuit and 
then “migration” to the Supreme Court, and its “aggressive promotion by the executive branch lawyers” 
who saw the potential in it for greater deference to administrative interpretations. Merrill, supra note 
157, at 422–26. He concluded that Chevron “became great not because of the inherent importance of the 
issue presented, but because the opinion happened to be written in such a way that key actors in the legal 
system later decided to make it a great case.” Id. at 427. 
161  INS v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 454 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment). 
162  Even earlier, Justice Stevens signaled the division to come. In a 1986 dissent, he alone would 
have invalidated a regulation as inconsistent with a statute’s clear meaning, and he described the eight-
Justice majority opinion as “reflect[ing] an absence of judgment and of judging” and “employ[ing] a 
reasoning so formulaic that it trivializes the art of judging.” Young v. Cmty. Nutrition Inst., 476 U.S. 
974, 985, 988 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (disagreeing with the Court’s finding of statutory 
ambiguity). 
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government’s attempted regulation of tobacco products,163 refusal to 
regulate greenhouse gases,164 and attempted prosecution of physicians who 
assist terminally ill patients to commit suicide.165 
Commentators who address the usefulness of the Chevron analogy in 
the foreign affairs context similarly span a large divide on the deference 
spectrum. Some disagreements mirror hot debates in the domestic context. 
Most fundamentally, in both contexts, the choice by a commentator to 
privilege one of Chevron’s twin virtues—accountability or expertise—often 
proves determinative. Other disputes include whether the AUMF and the 
UCMJ are comparable to the Administrative Procedure Act166 and the 
Freedom of Information Act,167 which the Court has found are not subject to 
Chevron deference because they are aimed at constraining the Executive. 
And are executive positions first developed in the context of litigation 
deserving of deference? Differences specific to foreign affairs include how 
one views the constitutional allocation of relevant authorities and the proper 
place of international law.168 
Impressive scholarship since the initial Harvard Law Review and Yale 
Law Journal debates evaluates such questions of foreign affairs deference, 
as well as related questions that arise in the context of claims for 
compensation by alleged victims of unlawful detention, surveillance, or 
interrogation.169 Before moving in Part III to one respect in which the 
literature seems relatively incomplete, this Part concludes by endorsing a 
dominant emergent strand that takes a balanced, nonabsolutist approach to 
foreign affairs deference. A balanced approach that supports some measure 
of deference in circumstances that reflect executive expertise and 
accountability seems clearly correct as a normative matter and also enjoys 
substantial doctrinal support.170 
Even prior to 9/11, the Court did not consistently apply Curtiss-
Wright-like deference. Professor David Sloss argues that the Hamdan 
Court’s posture of nondeference to the Executive’s treaty interpretation is 
consistent with the Court’s approach in the United States’ first half century, 
 
163  FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120 (2000). 
164  Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007). 
165  Gonzales v. Oregon, 546 U.S. 243 (2006). 
166  5 U.S.C. § 500 (2006). 
167  Id. § 552. 
168  Various commentators, for example, address the import of the Charming Betsy doctrine, which 
directs courts where possible to construe statutes to avoid conflicts with international law. See Murray v. 
Schooner Charming Betsy, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 64 (1804). 
169  See infra note 293. 
170  One caution: positions at the extreme may be repackaged in the guise of Chevron. For example, 
among those who have praised the invocation of Chevron by Posner and Sunstein for foreign affairs is 
John Yoo, a harsh critic of Hamdan and supporter of a more extreme version of Sunstein’s “super-
strong” deference. See Julian Ku & John Yoo, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Functional Case for Foreign 
Affairs Deference to the Executive Branch, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 179, 195–96 (2006). 
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which suggests constitutional text, structure, and history are not dispositive 
and leave room for the consideration of functional concerns.171 More recent 
precedent and practice also are less determinate than commonly believed. 
An influential 1994 study by Professor David Bederman had found that the 
Executive’s treaty interpretation was the best indicator of the Court’s own 
interpretation from the 1950s to the early 1990s.172 The Court regularly talks 
of giving “great weight” to the Executive’s treaty interpretations, including 
in an opinion issued just one day before the Court all but ignored the 
deference issue in Hamdan.173 More recent scholarship, however, 
persuasively questions the conventional narrative about how much 
deference the Court actually has given the Executive. Professor Robert 
Chesney in particular helpfully situates the historical development of 
deference to executive treaty interpretations among foreign relations 
deference generally, including Curtiss-Wright.174 In seeking to isolate actual 
deference from other influences in Rehnquist-era treaty cases, Professor 
Chesney finds persuasive evidence to counter Bederman’s conclusion.175 
Recent works by Professor Chesney and Professor Deborah Pearlstein 
are especially notable for contributing theoretical support and practical 
detail toward an optimal intermediate approach. They do not address nor 
agree upon all particulars, but they both move the conversation usefully in a 
direction closer to Professors Jinks and Katyal—and their advocacy of 
attention to the actual internal processes followed—than to Professors 
Posner and Sunstein, who tend more toward near-absolute deference with 
limited exceptions. After reviewing a variety of “intermediate deference” 
positions, Professor Chesney makes a strong case for limiting deference to 
treaty interpretations reached through Chevron-style rulemaking or a 
similarly formal legal opinion by a relevant department—and not, for 
example, positions merely adopted in litigation.176 This seems appropriate 
for statutes as well as treaties. Interpretations adopted in the course of 
litigation do not reflect only the Executive’s effort to bring expertise and 
judgment to bear on achieving the best legal interpretation of the provision; 
they also may reflect, for example, government litigators’ judgments about 
what will prevail in the courts or what will maximize broader governmental 
interests such as a desire to maximize the government’s own authority. 
 
171  David Sloss, Judicial Deference to Executive Branch Treaty Interpretations: A Historical 
Exception, 62 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 497 (2007). 
172  David J. Bederman, Revivalist Canons and Treaty Interpretation, 41 UCLA L. REV. 953, 1015 
(1994). 
173  Chesney, supra note 136, at 1727 (discussing Sanchez-Llamas v. Oregon, 548 U.S. 331 (2006)). 
174  Id. at 1733–51. 
175  Id. at 1754–58. He does not, though, go as far as Professor Martin Flaherty who also contributes 
to the foreign affairs deference debate and colorfully suggests, “Much like a blimp, the doctrine appears 
ponderous but in reality has little weight.” Martin S. Flaherty, Judicial Foreign Relations Authority After 
9/11, 56 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 119, 127 (2011). 
176  Chesney, supra note 136, at 1773. 
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Professor Pearlstein’s comprehensive assessment of both statutory and 
treaty deference in the foreign relations context also persuasively negates an 
absolute or “super-strong” approach. She concludes with the suggestion that 
the most appropriate form in the foreign affairs context may not be Chevron 
deference at all, but lesser Skidmore deference, under which courts defer to 
an executive interpretation only to the degree to which it is persuasive and 
after considering the actual processes by which it was reached.177 Skidmore 
deference seems too far from current practice to be palatable to the Court 
and, similar to Katyal’s creative but ultimately misguided “Director of 
Adjudication,” might in fact go too far in its focus on bureaucratic expertise 
to the near exclusion of political accountability and presidential direction. A 
serious challenge in applying Chevron, which is heightened in the foreign 
affairs context, is distinguishing between desirable political accountability 
and undesirable politicization.178 In any event, Pearlstein’s thoughtful 
analysis adds to the deference debate the relevance of theories of judicial 
power; she suggests in particular that courts should consider what is 
necessary to maintain constitutional equilibrium in the context not only of 
constitutional adjudiciation, but also of the deference due statutory and 
treaty interpretations.179 Pearlstein is correct to highlight the broader 
separation of powers context and also to advocate some measure of judicial 
attention to internal processes, which encourages (in the first instance) 
executive interpretive processes and related policymaking that in fact do 
reflect executive expertise and principled deliberation. 
The deference debate’s rich normative discussion thus supports and 
helps delineate an appropriately balanced intermediate approach to foreign 
affairs deference. Less complete (and the subject of the next Part) is its 
descriptive account of why the post-9/11 Court did not endorse even 
moderate deference and what that lack of deference portends. Because the 
Court said so little on the subject, any account is necessarily speculative, 
and the reasons are almost certainly multiple and complex. They 
undoubtedly include the Court’s recognition of its special role in 
safeguarding individual liberty against executive abuse—a role the Hamdi 
 
177  Pearlstein, supra note 157, at 851–52; see Skidmore v. Swift & Co., 323 U.S. 134 (1944). 
178  Pearlstein and Katyal are correct to highlight the importance of agency expertise, which Sunstein 
excessively discounts in favor of accountability. But agency experts themselves may develop tendencies 
toward institutional absolutism (including in support of executive power) that can be appropriately 
tempered by the judgment of officials who are more politically accountable. Recent scholarship 
demonstrates the complexity of issues of political accountability. See, e.g., David J. Barron, From 
Takeover to Merger: Reforming Administrative Law in an Age of Agency Politicization, 76 GEO. WASH. 
L. REV. 1095, 1095–1102 (2008) (discussing competing views and distinctions between agency 
politicization and centralization). 
179  Pearlstein, supra note 157, at 836–42 (describing “equilibrium theory”). 
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plurality expressly embraced180—and a determination never to repeat the 
mistake of Korematsu’s excessive deference.181 
Beyond that, commentators offer helpful speculation. Posner and 
Sunstein characterize the Hamdan Court’s neglect of the analogy to 
Chevron deference as “a puzzling and important omission”182 and seem to 
favor the conclusion that “Hamdan is simply wrong” in some respects;183 
their alternative “most sympathetic reconstruction” would read Hamdan as 
resting on a special requirement for criminal trials of a clear congressional 
statement to “authorize a departure from standard adjudicative forms and 
procedures.”184 Other explanations draw upon Justice Stevens’s position in 
Chevron to understand Hamdan: as Professors Katyal and Pearlstein note, 
the Court (and especially Justice Stevens) sometimes has been unwilling to 
afford Chevron deference in the domestic context where the facts suggest 
the Executive did not actually rely on the views of agency experts185—
which was also true of President Bush’s military commissions.186 Katyal 
predicts that the Court in future cases similarly will require “deliberative 
and sober bureaucratic decisionmaking.”187 Pearlstein describes the Court’s 
post-9/11 approach as calling into question and rendering “increasingly 
 
180  See Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 536 (2004) (O’Connor, J., plurality opinion). 
181  See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
182  Posner & Sunstein, supra note 154, at 1178. 
183  Id. at 1225. 
184  Id. at 1225–26. 
185  Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497 (2007), is one clear example. Justice Stevens, writing for 
the Court, found that although the EPA possessed relevant expertise it could have applied to the 
regulation of greenhouse gases, it had not actually done so. Id. at 533–34. Instead, the Court cited 
potential harm to the President’s ability to negotiate with foreign nations, which fell within the State 
Department’s purview. Id. This reasoning is reminiscent of Justice Stevens’s constitutional ruling in his 
very first majority opinion, Hampton v. Mow Sun Wong, 426 U.S. 88 (1976), which held that the 
authority of an executive branch agency depended on whether it was the agency with relevant expertise 
and jurisdiction—there, to limit certain federal jobs to U.S. citizens.  
186  Pearlstein puts it well in describing Hamdan: “Expertise in the Executive was not a functional 
advantage to be assumed; it was a virtue executives would have to demonstrate.” Pearlstein, supra note 
135, at 1310. Katyal similarly concludes that the Hamdan Court “consciously refused to award 
deference to the presidential determinations at issue because they lacked support from the bureaucracy, 
and in particular the Judge Advocates General and the State Department.” Katyal, supra note 146, at 
105. 
187  Katyal, supra note 146, at 105. This prediction, however, seems a bit too narrowly focused on 
the lack of bureaucratic support and overconfident in generalizing from Hamdan to predict the Court 
will require evidence of such support in future cases. Posner and Sunstein object that the Court has not 
generally required this evidence in the past in the domestic context and should not, especially on foreign 
affairs questions. Posner & Sunstein, supra note 154, at 1214. Katyal’s brief analysis of the 
accountability factor—particularly his suggestion that Hamdan would have been more difficult to win in 
Bush’s first term because voters could have held him accountable by not reelecting him—is 
unpersuasive, in terms of how courts are likely to approach foreign affairs deference; in any event, his 
useful point is to elevate the need for bureaucratic expertise. See Katyal, supra note 146, at 107. 
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untenable” the standard historical account that “the Court will defer to 
executive views in core matters of foreign relations.”188 
As this Article’s next Part elaborates, one additional factor may have 
played a substantial role in the post-9/11 Court’s refusal to defer and its 
willingness to reach the merits of detainees’ claims: the exceptional 
circumstances surrounding those cases, and especially the Bush 
Administration’s flawed approach to its own constitutional authority. 
Absent similar circumstances, the Court may afford significant deference to 
executive interpretations involving foreign affairs without, for example, 
invariably requiring evidence of “deliberative and sober bureaucratic 
decisionmaking.”189 In any event, attention to those exceptional 
circumstances helpfully informs analysis of both judicial deference and 
nonjudicial checks on the legality of executive action. 
III. PRESIDENTIAL ASSERTIONS OF PRECLUSIVE WAR POWERS 
One aspect of the rich, post-9/11 academic debate over foreign affairs 
deference seems incomplete: remarkably little relates the deference issue to 
the extraordinary nature of the legal interpretations to which the Court 
refused to defer.190 Books, articles, congressional hearings, ethics inquiries, 
and blog posts all have detailed the notoriously flawed nature of some early 
legal interpretations provided by the Department of Justice’s Office of 
Legal Counsel (OLC) to inform the terrorism policies at issue. As the Court 
and the world learned, initially through leaks from an excessively secretive 
Administration, OLC’s legal analysis on some war and terrorism issues did 
not adhere to traditional standards and processes aimed at achieving 
accurate and principled interpretations of statutes and treaties. In addition to 
adopting an extreme view of executive power, in the most egregious cases, 
OLC’s analysis and the processes it followed seemed distorted to serve 
desired policies, chief among them, the use of harsh and unlawful methods 
of interrogation, including torture.191 
 
188  Pearlstein, supra note 157, at 785–86. 
189  Katyal, supra note 146, at 105. 
190  Along these lines, Professors Katyal and Pearlstein discuss one important particular aspect of the 
context of Hamdan: the possible relevance of the absence of experts within the Executive Branch in the 
development of the military commissions. Professor Katyal also has written of his efforts in litigating 
Hamdan to take advantage of the broader context of the controversial Bush policies. See supra Part II. I 
also have written elsewhere about the relevance of Hamdan’s context. See Dawn E. Johnsen, The Story 
of Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: Trying Enemy Combatants by Military Commission, in PRESIDENTIAL POWER 
STORIES 447 (Christopher H. Schroeder & Curtis A. Bradley eds., 2009). 
191  I have written elsewhere and testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee about deficiencies 
in the legal advice and processes followed by the Bush Administration’s OLC. See Secret Law and the 
Threat to Democratic and Accountable Government: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution 
of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2008); Confirmation Hearing on the Nomination of 
Michael B. Mukasey to Be Attorney General of the United States: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 110th Cong. (2008); Dawn E. Johnsen, Faithfully Executing the Laws: Internal Legal 
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It is a simple point. At least by the time of Hamdan, the Court may 
have felt that even to cite traditional deference standards might signal 
approval of what it knew to be fundamentally flawed interpretations, 
processes, and policies by an Administration that had failed to honor core 
rule-of-law values. The Bush Administration can be viewed as, in effect, 
having forfeited its claim to deference through its failure to fulfill 
responsibilities of a constitutional dimension and of direct relevance to 
Chevron’s theory of delegated authority: the Executive’s obligation to take 
care that the law is faithfully interpreted and executed, to respect the 
constitutional roles of Congress and the courts, and to act in the transparent 
manner essential to democratic accountability. The Court may have 
deferred so little because it believed that this unusual category of legal 
interpretations simply did not merit traditional deference. 
A cogent assessment that reflects this context came in a blog post 
about Hamdan from former Solicitor General and OLC head Walter 
Dellinger: 
[T]he court confronted and rejected a deep theory of the Constitution that had 
been developed by the incumbent administration and was invoked to justify 
perhaps hundreds of executive decisions . . . that at least appeared to violate 
valid acts of Congress. The rejection of that imperial claim is what is important 
about this case.  
 It’s not about the military commissions. . . . As Marty 
Lederman . . . said . . . , future historians are about as likely to think of 
Hamdan as a “military commissions case” as they are to think of Youngstown 
Sheet & Steel v. Sawyer as a decision about “steel mill law.” Hamdan is about 
the OLC torture memo; and it’s about whether the president can refuse to 
comply with the McCain Amendment. It’s about all those laws the president 
says, as he signs them, that he will not commit to obey, if in his view foreign 
relations or deliberative processes of the executive or other matters may be 
affected. And, by the way, he won’t even commit to tell Congress he is not 
obeying the law. That is what it’s about.192 
 
Constraints on Executive Power, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1559 (2007). In these sources, I describe the OLC’s 
traditional functions, processes, and interpretive stance. I also discussed and appended a document I 
coauthored in which nineteen former OLC lawyers set forth ten longstanding, nonpartisan principles that 
have guided OLC’s work, in response to what we saw as dangerous deviations from practice in OLC’s 
advice on the legality of extreme interrogation techniques. The first principle states, “OLC should 
provide an accurate and honest appraisal of applicable law, even if that advice will constrain the 
administration’s pursuit of desired policies.” WALTER E. DELLINGER, DAWN JOHNSEN ET AL., 
PRINCIPLES TO GUIDE THE OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL (2004), reprinted in Johnsen, supra, at 1603. 
192  Walter Dellinger, A Supreme Court Conversation: Still “the Most Important Decision on 
Presidential Power Ever,” SLATE (June 30, 2006, 6:03 PM), http://www.slate.com/id/2144476. 
Dellinger was referencing a conversation he had with Professor Marty Lederman shortly after the Court 
decided Hamdan. (Dellinger served as the Assistant Attorney General for OLC during the Clinton 
Administration, and Lederman served at OLC for periods under Presidents Clinton, Bush, and Obama.) 
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The Court of course did not say any of this in Hamdan. Nor did it use 
more traditional language of deference and find the Bush Administration’s 
views unreasonable. Those who support a vibrant judiciary, strongly 
protective of individual rights against unlawful governmental action, 
understandably may prefer to interpret the Court’s silence as a marked shift 
away from foreign affairs deference. Litigants challenging governmental 
action surely will seek to generalize from the lack of deference. Taken 
together, the rulings certainly constitute a definitive rejection of the near-
absolute foreign affairs deference reflected in the Curtiss-Wright dicta and 
propounded by the Bush Administration. They reinforce the central lesson 
of the Court’s abject failure in Korematsu, cautioning against excessive 
deference in cases involving individual liberties.193 They also invite legal 
scholars to develop (as they have) thoughtful intermediate approaches, the 
desirability of which are further encouraged by the apparent absence, at 
least so far, of the harmful consequences for national security that the 
dissenting Justices and Bush Administration officials predicted would result 
from the Court’s intervention.194 No genuine dispute remains that the legal 
advice was badly defective. Officials from both political parties, and even 
from within the Bush Administration, condemned it,195 though that 
consensus is sometimes lost—occasionally intentionally obfuscated—in 
partisan disputes about counterterrorism policies.196 
 
193  See Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944). 
194  Justice Scalia’s dissent in Boumediene charged that the majority’s approach “will almost 
certainly cause more Americans to be killed.” Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 827–28 (Scalia, J., 
dissenting); see supra text accompanying note 121. 
195  See, e.g., JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE THE BUSH 
ADMINISTRATION (2007) (quoted infra notes 231–32 and accompanying text); id. at 161 (“No one 
except [Vice President Dick Cheney’s Counsel David] Addington disputed that the opinions I had 
withdrawn and redone (or started to redo) were deeply flawed.”); Press Release, Sen. Lindsey Graham, 
Senate Armed Services Committee Hearing: Opening Statement for Detainee & Interrogation Hearing 
(June 17, 2008) (“I have long made clear I believe the [Bush] Administration’s lawyers used bizarre 
legal theories to justify harsh interrogation techniques. . . . I could go on and on about the legal analysis 
that any first year law student could poke holes in.”); see also Editorial, The Torturers’ Manifesto, N.Y. 
TIMES, Apr. 18, 2009, at WK9 (“These memos are not an honest attempt to set the legal limits on 
interrogations, which was the authors’ statutory obligation. They were written to provide legal immunity 
for acts that are clearly illegal, immoral and a violation of this country’s most basic values.”). 
196  This fact also is clouded by the confusing conclusion of the Office of Professional 
Responsibility’s (OPR) exhaustive investigation into a difficult question that goes beyond the 
deficiencies in OLC’s legal advice: whether the advice was so egregiously flawed that it merited 
sanctions against the top lawyers responsible. In its 261-page report, OPR detailed the numerous legal 
errors and concluded that Assistant Attorney General Jay Bybee, who headed OLC, and his deputy, John 
Yoo, had committed professional misconduct that merited referral to their respective state bar 
disciplinary authorities. OFFICE OF PROF’L RESPONSIBILITY, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REPORT: 
INVESTIGATION INTO THE OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL’S MEMORANDA CONCERNING ISSUES RELATING 
TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY’S USE OF “ENHANCED INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES” ON 
SUSPECTED TERRORISTS 260 (2009). The OPR report quotes, for example, former Attorney General 
Michael Mukasey calling one of the OLC memos a “slovenly mistake.” Id. at 9. A subsequent acting 
head of OLC under President Bush, Daniel Levin, described his own reaction as “this is insane, who 
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As a purely predictive matter, however, the Court’s 9/11 detainee 
opinions probably do not signal as wholesale a rejection of foreign affairs 
deference as some commentators hope and others fear.197 Under those 
decisions, the Court might afford substantial deference to a future 
Administration’s legal interpretations on similar foreign affairs matters. 
Appreciation of this possibility is important regardless of one’s views and 
hopes. Unrealistic expectations about what the decisions portend could 
distract from the essential truth that protecting against unlawful executive 
action always has and always will require more than the possibility of 
judicial review. It requires close attention to the legality of executive action, 
and the quality of executive legal interpretation, from other forces with the 
potential to provide meaningful checks: Congress, the press, the public, 
nongovernmental organizations, and individuals and entities within the 
Executive Branch. Also important to future meaningful checks is a shared 
public understanding of what precisely was wrong with the legal 
interpretations that underlay the early Bush Administration policies. 
The brief review that follows establishes at least two vital facts. First, 
as section A below describes, when the Supreme Court issued each of its 
9/11 detainee rulings, much was publicly available and widely known about 
the flawed nature of the Executive’s extreme claims of authority. In 
litigating before the Court, the Bush Administration emphasized narrower 
justifications for its policies than those upon which it initially relied and 
downplayed inflammatory claims of presidential authority to violate 
statutes and treaties. The Administration also went to exceptional lengths to 
keep details of its actions and supportive OLC memos or other legal 
justifications secret from the public and Congress. But by the time the 9/11 
 
wrote this?” Id. at 124. Whether those egregious errors constitute professional misconduct that warrants 
referral, as OPR concluded, is a much more difficult question. Indeed, on review, Associate Deputy 
Attorney General David Margolis decided to “not adopt” OPR’s conclusion because in his judgment, the 
attorneys had not “violate[d] a clear obligation or standard.” Memorandum from David Margolis, Assoc. 
Deputy Attorney Gen., to the Attorney Gen. & Deputy Attorney Gen. 2, 68 (Jan. 5, 2010) [hereinafter 
Margolis Memo], available at http://judiciary.house.gov/hearings/pdf/DAGMargolisMemo100105.pdf. 
Some Republican Senators and John Yoo himself have falsely described Margolis’s determination as a 
vindication of OLC’s advice. See The Office of Professional Responsibility Investigation into the Office 
of Legal Counsel Memoranda: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 111th Cong. (2010) 
(statements of various Senators throughout); cf. John Yoo, My Gift to President Obama, WALL ST. J., 
Feb. 24, 2010, at A17 (arguing President Obama should be grateful to him for “winning a drawn-out 
fight to protect his powers as commander in chief to wage war and keep Americans safe”). In fact, 
Margolis agreed that Bybee and Yoo’s legal advice contained “significant flaws” and reflected “poor 
judgment,” and he concluded, “John Yoo’s loyalty to his own ideology and convictions clouded his 
view of his obligation to his client.” Margolis Memo, supra, at 67–68. 
197  Professor Sunstein has found that courts of appeals upheld national security policies at a very 
high rate during President Bush’s administration, and that the rate did not change after the Supreme 
Court’s decisions upholding detainees’ claims, suggesting a continued very high degree of judicial 
deference. Cass R. Sunstein, Judging National Security Post-9/11: An Empirical Investigation, 
2008 SUP. CT. REV. 269, 271 (“The government loses only 15% of the litigated cases—a lower figure 
than in almost all other domains of federal law.”). 
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detainee cases reached the Court, efforts at excessive secrecy had 
significantly broken down, and the Justices were well aware of the 
deficiencies in the Bush Administration’s legal interpretations, the grave 
need for external checks, and the broader implications of their rulings.198 
Second, the Bush policies were deeply flawed in ways that are 
anomalous. A narrative of policy continuity has emerged during the Obama 
Administration that obscures critical differences and promotes inaccurate 
understandings of the extent to which presidents make sweeping claims of 
preclusive war powers. Another narrative of ever-expanding presidential 
war powers in modern times similarly obscures the exceptional nature of 
President Bush’s claims. President Obama, like all presidents, of course is 
vulnerable to criticism for his foreign affairs policies. But the differences 
between President Bush’s initial counterterrorism policies and those of 
other presidents, including President Obama, are profound in respects 
relevant to the rule of law and judicial review. As sections B and C below 
describe, President Bush stands alone in his pattern of often secret claims of 
broad constitutional authority to act in direct contradiction of statutes—or, 
similarly, to “interpret” statutes in light of his expansive views of his own 
constitutional powers in order to “avoid” constitutional conflict. President 
Bush and his advisors undoubtedly were motivated in their actions by a 
sincere desire to protect the nation’s security against terrible threats. In their 
choice of methods, however, they intentionally sought to expand 
presidential war powers and to diminish checks on the exercise of those 
powers from Congress, the courts, and the public, all while they weakened 
traditional checks internal to the Executive Branch. 
A. President George W. Bush’s Administration 
On June 28, 2004, the Court issued its first rulings rejecting the policy 
of indefinitely detaining suspected terrorists while denying access to 
lawyers and the courts.199 As the Bush Administration had informed the 
 
198  Part III.A expands on this point, but, to take one example, within minutes of the Court’s handing 
down of Hamdan, Professor Lederman wrote: 
 Even more importantly for present purposes, the Court held that Common Article 3 of Geneva 
applies as a matter of treaty obligation to the conflict against Al Qaeda. That is the HUGE part of 
today’s ruling. The commissions are the least of it. This basically resolves the debate about 
interrogation techniques, because Common Article 3 provides that detained persons “shall in all 
circumstances be treated humanely,” and that “[t]o this end,” certain specified acts “are and shall 
remain prohibited at any time and in any place whatsoever”—including “cruel treatment and 
torture,” and “outrages upon personal dignity, in particular humiliating and degrading 
treatment.” . . . 
 This almost certainly means that the CIA’s interrogation regime is unlawful, and indeed, that 
many techniques the Administration has been using, such as waterboarding and hypothermia (and 
others) violate the War Crimes Act (because violations of Common Article 3 are deemed war 
crimes). 
Marty Lederman, Hamdan Summary—And HUGE News, SCOTUSBLOG (June 29, 2006, 10:37 AM), 
http://www.scotusblog.com/2006/06/hamdan-summary-and-huge-news (emphases omitted). 
199  Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004); Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004). 
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Court in its briefs and the accompanying Jacoby Declaration, its denial of 
counsel and court access in part aimed at inducing in 9/11 detainees feelings 
of helplessness, dependency, and trust that the Administration believed 
would improve the effectiveness of its harsh interrogation techniques.200 
During the two months before the Court’s three rulings, the issue of the 
United States’ possible complicity in unlawful interrogations and even 
torture dominated the news. The Abu Ghraib scandal, with its horrific 
photographs of U.S. soldiers abusing Iraqi prisoners, broke on April 28, 
2004,201 the very day of the Padilla oral argument.202 In that scandal’s wake, 
someone leaked a shocking legal memorandum (“the Torture Memo”) 
issued almost two years earlier in which OLC secretly advised that a federal 
statute banning the use of torture could not constrain the President’s choice 
of interrogation methods in combating terrorism.203 President Bush already 
had announced, on February 7, 2002, his determination that Common 
Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions—which prohibited not only “cruel 
treatment and torture” but also “outrages upon personal dignity, in 
particular humiliating and degrading treatment”—did not apply to the 
conflict with al Qaeda.204 
The Torture Memo began with a flawed statutory analysis inconsistent 
with the clear import of the federal anti-torture statute, followed with an 
extreme theory of the President’s authority as Commander in Chief as 
allowing outright noncompliance with the statute, and concluded with 
 
200  See supra note 81. 
201  James Risen, G.I.’s Are Accused of Abusing Iraqi Captives, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 29, 2004, at A15 
(discussing the 60 Minutes II story that aired on CBS the previous night); see also Seymour M. Hersh, 
Torture at Abu Ghraib, NEW YORKER, May 10, 2004, at 42; Slide Show: The Abu Ghraib Pictures, New 
Yorker (May 3, 2004) http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2004/05/03/slideshow_040503. 
202  The story broke after the oral argument, during which the Justices asked what was to constrain 
the government from torturing detainees for information. The Solicitor General replied that the courts 
remained open as a check but urged the Justices to defer to the President: “[Y]ou have to trust the 
executive to make the kind of quintessential military judgments that are involved . . . .” Transcript of 
Oral Argument, Padilla v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 426 (2004) (No. 03-1027), 2004 WL 1066129, at *19; see 
also id. (“[T]hat executive discretion in a war situation can be abused is not a good and sufficient reason 
for judicial micromanagement and overseeing of that authority.”). Linda Greenhouse wrote in the New 
York Times that the discussion of torture in the oral argument took on a “different, even chilling, tone” in 
light of the release hours later of the Abu Ghraib photographs. Linda Greenhouse, Word for 
Word/Rumsfeld v. Padilla; The Supreme Court Asks: Who Will Guard the Guardians, N.Y. TIMES 
MAG., May 9, 2004, at WK7. 
203  Memorandum from Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, U.S. Dep’t 
of Justice, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Standards of Conduct for Interrogation 
Under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A (Aug. 1, 2002), in THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 59, at 172, 172 
[hereinafter OLC Torture Memo]; see Jane Mayer, The Memo: How an Internal Effort to Ban the Abuse 
and Torture of Detainees Was Thwarted, NEW YORKER, Feb. 27, 2006, at 32; Dana Priest & R. Jeffrey 
Smith, Memo Offered Justification for Use of Torture, WASH. POST, June 8, 2004, A1. 
204  Memorandum from President George W. Bush to Vice President Dick Cheney et al., Humane 
Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (Feb. 7, 2002), in THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 59, at 
134, 134. 
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faulty applications of the defense doctrines of necessity and self-defense. 
The Commander-in-Chief analysis was of broadest implication and failed 
even to acknowledge Congress’s countervailing constitutional war powers 
or the then-leading Supreme Court precedent of relevance, Youngstown 
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer.205 OLC’s interpretations in the Torture Memo, 
once leaked to the public, provoked widespread condemnation, prompting 
President Bush immediately to seek to distance himself from it and the Abu 
Ghraib abuses by declaring (just days before the Court released its initial 
detainee rulings) that “America stands against and will not tolerate 
torture.”206 
In December 2004—several months after the Court’s first 9/11 
decisions and long before Hamdan—the Bush Administration released 
another long-secret OLC opinion that explained its view of the Executive’s 
authority to act contrary to statutes.207 That memorandum, written just two 
weeks after 9/11, essentially interpreted the President’s constitutional 
authority as Commander in Chief as exceedingly broad and Congress’s war 
powers as exceedingly narrow: Congress may not “place any limits on the 
President’s determinations as to any terrorist threat, the amount of military 
force to be used in response, or the method, timing, and nature of the 
response.”208 Thus, the scope of the AUMF did not limit President Bush’s 
conduct of the “War on Terror.”209 Applying the same reasoning to criminal 
penalties Congress had imposed for torture, the Torture Memo put it this 
way: 
Congress can no more interfere with the President’s conduct of the 
interrogation of enemy combatants than it can dictate strategic or tactical 
decisions on the battlefield. Just as statutes that order the President to conduct 
warfare in a certain manner or for specific goals would be unconstitutional, so 
too are laws that seek to prevent the President from gaining the intelligence he 
believes necessary to prevent attacks upon the United States.210 
These radical arguments were widely known and criticized in the 
spring of 2006, as the Court considered the Bush Administration’s proposed 
 
205  343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952); see OLC Torture Memo, supra note 203, at 204–07. 
206  Statement on United Nations International Day in Support of Victims of Torture, 40 WEEKLY 
COMP. PRES. DOC. 1167, 1167 (June 26, 2004). 
207  The Bush Administration kept the memo secret until the Senate pressured release in connection 
with the confirmation hearing of Attorney General nominee Alberto Gonzales. Michael Isikoff, 2001 
Memo Reveals Push for Broader Presidential Powers, DAILY BEAST (Dec. 17, 2004, 7:00 PM), 
http://www.thedailybeast.com/newsweek/2004/12/17/2001-memo-reveals-push-for-broader-
presidential-powers.html. 
208  Memorandum from John Yoo, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to 
Timothy Flanigan, Deputy Counsel to the President, The President’s Constitutional Authority to 
Conduct Military Operations Against Terrorists and Nations Supporting Them (Sept. 25, 2001), in THE 
TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 59, at 3, 24. 
209  See, e.g., id. at 22–24. 
210  OLC Torture Memo, supra note 203, at 207. 
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interpretation of the AUMF as support for its military commissions in briefs 
submitted in Hamdan.211 In December 2005 the press uncovered another 
secret counterterrorism program that did not comply with federal statutory 
requirements, and which the Bush Administration justified based in part on 
the same, flawed Commander-in-Chief theory: for years, the Bush 
Administration had engaged in electronic surveillance in the United States 
without complying with the court-order requirements set forth in the federal 
Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act.212 The months before the Court 
issued Hamdan also brought detailed press reports of secret overseas black 
sites holding certain “high value” detainees;213 waterboarding and other 
extreme forms of interrogations (such as dousing detainees with extremely 
cold water in cells maintained at very low temperatures) used repeatedly 
and over long periods;214 and U.S. involvement in extraordinary renditions 
of detainees, including some later found to be innocent of any wrongdoing, 
to other countries where they were tortured.215 
In response, Congress enacted the Detainee Treatment Act (DTA), 
which, among other things, prohibited not only torture but also “cruel, 
inhuman, or degrading treatment or punishment.”216 When the Bush 
Administration could not stop the law, it achieved amendments to minimize 
what it viewed as the DTA’s harms.217 In signing the law, President Bush 
issued a statement in which he appeared to claim the right not to comply 
 
211  The Administration, however, did not present them directly to the Court, as Justice Stevens’s 
opinion for the Court would pointedly note. Justice Stevens wrote: “Whether or not the President has 
independent power, absent congressional authorization, to convene military commissions, he may not 
disregard limitations that Congress has, in proper exercise of its own war powers, placed on his powers. 
See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). “The 
Government does not argue otherwise.” Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 593 n.23 (2006). 
212  DOJ issued an unusual, unsigned “white paper”—rather than the more typical signed OLC 
memorandum—laying out its statutory and constitutional arguments in defense of noncompliance with 
the statute. Memorandum from U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Legal Auths. Supporting the Activities of the Nat’l 
Sec. Agency Described by the President (Jan. 19, 2006), reprinted in David Cole & Martin S. Lederman, 
The National Security Agency’s Domestic Spying Program: Framing the Debate, 81 IND. L.J. 1355, 
1374 (2006); see David Johnston & Neil A. Lewis, Defending Spy Program, Administration Cites Law, 
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 23, 2005, at A20. 
213  See Michael A. Fletcher, Bush Defends CIA’s Clandestine Prisons, WASH. POST, Nov. 8, 2005, 
at A15; Brian Ross & Richard Esposito, CIA’s Harsh Interrogation Techniques Described, ABC NEWS 
(Nov. 18, 2005), http://abcnews.go.com/Blotter/Investigation/story?id=1322866. 
214  Ross & Esposito, supra note 213. 
215  See Jane Mayer, Outsourcing Torture: The Secret History of America’s “Extraordinary 
Rendition” Program, NEW YORKER, Feb. 14 & 21, 2005, at 106. 
216  42 U.S.C. § 2000dd(a) (2006). 
217  The meaning of one such provision, depriving the federal courts of jurisdiction, was at issue in 
Hamdan. See Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557, 572–84 (2006); supra Part I.D; see also Jonathan 
Mahler, The Bush Administration vs. Salim Hamdan, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Jan. 8, 2006, at 44, 88 
(describing how Senator Lindsey Graham “effectively interced[ed] on the administration’s behalf in 
what amounted to an end run around the Supreme Court” by securing approval of an amendment that 
stripped Guantánamo detainees of habeas rights). 
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with the DTA or, alternatively, to interpret it to be consistent with his 
expansive view of his constitutional authorities.218 This signing statement 
provoked strong objections from members of Congress, led by the DTA’s 
principal sponsor, former Vietnam prisoner of war and victim of torture 
Senator John McCain, and the Washington Post editorialized about the risk 
that illegal abuse would continue.219 OLC, in fact, proceeded to interpret the 
DTA as not prohibiting waterboarding or other extreme forms of 
interrogation, in opinions reported in the press but which the Bush 
Administration refused to release.220 
Through signing statements, President Bush controversially claimed 
the right to refuse to enforce literally hundreds of federal statutory 
provisions in addition to the DTA, or to interpret them to avoid conflicts 
with his extreme view of his constitutional powers.221 Although President 
Bush began releasing such statements at the outset of his presidency—and 
had objected to the constitutionality of over a thousand statutory provisions 
by the end of 2006222—the radical import of these abbreviated and vague 
 
218  His signing statement announced he would construe the DTA “in a manner consistent with the 
constitutional authority of the President . . . as Commander in Chief and consistent with the 
constitutional limitations on the judicial power.” Statement on Signing the Department of Defense, 
Emergency Supplemental Appropriations to Address Hurricanes in the Gulf of Mexico, and Pandemic 
Influenza Act, 2006, 41 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1918, 1919 (Dec. 30, 2005). 
219  Editorial, Unchecked Abuse, WASH. POST, Jan. 11, 2006, at A20 (“Without aggressive 
monitoring—and possibly further action—by Congress, illegal abuse of foreign prisoners in the custody 
of the United States is likely to continue.”); see also David E. Sanger & Eric Schmitt, Bush Says He’s 
Confident that He and McCain Will Reach Agreement on Interrogation Policy, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 13, 
2005, at A22. 
220  Scott Shane, David Johnston & James Risen, Secret U.S. Endorsement of Severe Interrogations, 
N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 4, 2007, at A1 (“In the end, Mr. Bradbury’s opinion delivered what the White House 
wanted: a statement that the standard imposed by Mr. McCain’s Detainee Treatment Act would not 
force any change in the C.I.A.’s practices, according to officials familiar with the memo.”). The memos, 
made public years later by the Obama Administration, confirm the press accounts. See Memorandum 
from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to John 
A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy Gen. Counsel, CIA, Application of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A to the Combined 
Use of Certain Techniques in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees (May 10, 2005); 
Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal 
Counsel, to John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy Gen. Counsel, CIA, Application of 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A 
to Certain Techniques that May Be Used in the Interrogation of a High Value al Qaeda Detainee (May 
10, 2005); Memorandum from Steven G. Bradbury, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of 
Legal Counsel, to John A. Rizzo, Senior Deputy Gen. Counsel, CIA, Application of United States 
Obligations Under Article 16 of the Convention Against Torture to Certain Techniques That May Be 
Used in the Interrogation of High Value al Qaeda Detainees (May 30, 2005). These and other opinions 
released by the Obama Administration, along with memoranda explaining their release and withdrawal, 
can be found at Office of Legal Counsel: Selected Opinions, FED’N AM. SCIENTISTS, http://www.fas.org/
irp/agency/doj/olc/index.html (last visited May 18, 2012). 
221  See, e.g., Charlie Savage, Bush Challenges Hundreds of Laws: President Cites Powers of His 
Office, BOSTON GLOBE, Apr. 30, 2006, at A1. 
222  See Neil Kinkopf, Signing Statements and Statutory Interpretation in the Bush Administration, 
16 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 307, 308 (2008). 
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references to his Commander in Chief authority remained unclear until the 
secret opinions on torture and war powers became publicly available in 
2004. 
Thus, the Court knew at the time of its Hamdi and Rasul rulings 
against unreviewable indefinite detention that the Administration opposed 
habeas review because of perceived interference with its desired methods of 
detainee interrogation. Similarly, the Hamdan Court was well aware that its 
Common Article 3 ruling doomed not only the military commissions before 
it, but also the Bush Administration’s use of waterboarding and many other 
extreme interrogation methods.223 The Court knew that the Administration’s 
contrary interpretation of Common Article 3 came over the objection of the 
State Department,224 and that as Counsel to the President, Alberto Gonzales 
described the protections of Geneva Conventions as “quaint” and 
“obsolete.”225 (Gonzales was Attorney General at the time of Hamdan.) The 
Court also knew that the Administration developed the particulars of the 
military commissions—including the possibility of a detainee being 
sentenced to death following a military trial that admitted evidence secured 
by torture—by largely excluding or ignoring the advice of key executive 
branch officials, both career experts and top political appointees like 
Secretary of State Colin Powell and National Security Advisor Condoleezza 
Rice.226 The press also had reported on strong opposition within the 
Executive Branch to the extreme interrogation methods.227 
 
223  In response to the Court’s ruling in Hamdan, President Bush ordered a halt to the CIA program 
of “enhanced” interrogations at secret black sites overseas and ordered that fourteen “high-value” al 
Qaeda suspects be moved to Guantánamo Bay from the black sites to await legal proceedings. See 
Remarks on the War on Terror, 42 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. DOC. 1569 (Sept. 6, 2006); David E. Sanger, 
President Moves 14 Held in Secret to Guantánamo, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 7, 2006, at A1. The CIA also 
prepared a new list of approved interrogation techniques that no longer included waterboarding. Scott 
Shane, White House Retreats Under Pressure, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 18, 2007, at A22. In July 2007, 
President Bush issued an executive order that allowed the CIA to resume certain harsh interrogation 
techniques, but not waterboarding. Mark Mazzetti, Rules Lay Out C.I.A.’s Tactics in Questioning, N.Y. 
TIMES, July 21, 2007, at A1. 
224  The President rejected the Department of State’s interpretation in favor of the position 
elaborated in an OLC opinion of January 22, 2002, that concluded the best interpretation of “armed 
conflict not of an international character” limited its reach to civil-war conflicts. See Memorandum from 
Jay S. Bybee, Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the 
President, and William J. Haynes II, Gen. Counsel of the Dep’t of Defense, Application of Treaties and 
Laws to al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (Jan. 22, 2002) in THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 59, at 81, 
81. 
225  Eric Lichtblau, Bush Nominee Plans to Stand Firm on War-Captive Memo, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 6, 
2005, at A25. 
226  Tim Golden, After Terror, a Secret Rewriting of Military Law, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 2004, at A1; 
see also Memorandum from Patrick F. Philbin, Deputy Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal 
Counsel, to Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President, Legality of the Use of Military Commissions 
to Try Terrorists (Nov. 6, 2001), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/2001/pub-millcommfinal.pdf. 
227  See, e.g., Mayer, supra note 203 (describing internal opposition and highlighting that of U.S. 
Navy General Counsel Alberto Mora). 
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By the time the Court issued its 2008 opinion in Boumediene v. Bush, 
journalist Charlie Savage had been awarded the 2007 Pulitzer Prize for his 
pre-Hamdan coverage of Bush’s signing statements.228 That same year, 
Savage published a highly acclaimed and widely read account of the Bush 
Administration’s efforts, led by Vice President Dick Cheney, to conduct 
itself in ways aimed at expanding the constitutional powers of the 
presidency.229 Vice President Cheney believed that responses to Watergate 
and Vietnam had dangerously weakened the presidency and that Congress 
in particular had encroached on executive power.230 Professor Jack 
Goldsmith, the Assistant Attorney General heading OLC in 2003 and 2004, 
published a valuable and truly remarkable insider’s account confirming that 
the desire to expand presidential power greatly influenced the way in which 
the Bush Administration formulated counterterrorism policy.231 He reported 
feeling “astonished, and immensely worried” to learn of OLC’s then-secret 
advice, which he found “deeply flawed . . . sloppily reasoned, overbroad, 
and incautious.”232 
Finally, also in 2007, the nation—and the Court—witnessed the 
dramatic story of DOJ’s refusal to sanction continuation of the then-current 
formulation of the Terrorist Surveillance Program. Goldsmith later 
described the program to Congress as “the biggest legal mess I’ve ever 
encountered,”233 complete with top White House officials attempting to 
pressure a hospitalized and highly sedated Attorney General to approve the 
plan and threatened mass resignations from the entire leadership of DOJ.234 
Goldsmith resigned nine months after taking office (and has reported 
drafting three resignation letters in that time). He concluded that, ironically, 
 
228  See Katharine Q. Seelye & James Barron, Wall Street Journal Wins 2 Pulitzer Prizes; History of 
Civil Rights Reporting Also Wins, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 17, 2007, at B8. 
229  See CHARLIE SAVAGE, TAKEOVER: THE RETURN OF THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY AND THE 
SUBVERSION OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY (2007); id. at 9 (quoting Cheney’s 1996 speech, noting that “it 
was important to go back and try to restore that balance” in favor of “a strong presidency” (internal 
quotation mark omitted)). 
230  Numerous reports have described Cheney’s aspirations and efforts to expand presidential power. 
See, e.g., Jonathan Mahler, After the Imperial Presidency, N.Y. TIMES MAG., Nov. 9, 2008, at 42. 
231  “Cheney and the President told top aides at the outset of the first term that past presidents had 
‘eroded’ presidential power, and that they wanted ‘to restore’ it so that they could ‘hand off a much 
more powerful presidency to their successors.” GOLDSMITH, supra note 195, at 89. Goldsmith described 
extreme pressures from the White House to tailor OLC’s legal advice to support desired terrorism 
policies. Goldsmith described Counsel to the Vice President David Addington’s dramatic response to his 
legal advice on a counterterrorism initiative: “If you rule that way, the blood of the hundred thousand 
people who die in the next attack will be on your hands.” Id. at 71 (internal quotation marks omitted). 
232  Id. at 10. 
233  Preserving the Rule of Law in the Fight Against Terrorism: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 110th Cong. 7 (2007) (testimony of Jack Goldsmith, former Assistant Att’y Gen., Dep’t of 
Justice). 
234  See id.; Preserving Prosecutorial Independence: Is the Department of Justice Politicizing the 
Hiring and Firing of U.S. Attorneys?: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 219 
(2007) (testimony of James B. Comey, former Deputy Att’y Gen., Dep’t of Justice). 
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the Bush Administration’s desire to “‘hand off a much more powerful 
presidency’ to their successors” led the Bush Administration to 
“unnecessary unilateralism”235 and a “go-it-alone approach” that threatened 
legitimate presidential power.236 Details of the Terrorist Surveillance 
Program, and the legal advice informing it, still have not been made public. 
This was the backdrop against which the Supreme Court construed the 
meaning and reviewed the application of federal statutes and international 
treaties to the 9/11 detainees and, more to the point, against which the Court 
reviewed the Bush Administration’s determinations in the first years after 
9/11 about those meanings and applications. As discussed above, legal 
scholars continue to debate the intricacies of the appropriate deference 
under Chevron and other theories, considering, for example, whether and 
under what circumstances the AUMF and the UCMJ are the types of 
statutes regarding which the Executive’s interpretations merit deference. 
The Hamdan Court’s silence probably reflects that the Court did not think 
in these terms. Under any theory, except perhaps one of absolute deference, 
President Bush’s claim for deference in Hamdan fails.237 Recall the 
delegation theory behind Chevron: the presumption that Congress would 
prefer the Executive, a politically accountable branch with superior 
expertise, to resolve statutory ambiguities and fill gaps. That presumption is 
utterly defeated by evidence that the Executive’s legal interpretations were 
not aimed at providing the best view of the law; not informed by relevant 
experts; reportedly and self-evidently skewed, including to facilitate cruel, 
inhuman, and degrading treatment and even torture; often reached initially 
in secret and without accountability; and driven by an effort to expand 
executive power to the exclusion of Congress, the courts, and international 
treaty obligations. 
B. President Bush’s Predecessors 
The argument for deference might be stronger if this were business as 
usual, that is if Congress regularly legislated against a backdrop of 
presidents who claimed expansive constitutional war powers to act contrary 
to statutory requirements and fundamental treaty obligations. In their 
comprehensive review of presidential war powers throughout U.S. history, 
Professors David Barron and Marty Lederman demonstrate that this is 
 
235  GOLDSMITH, supra note 195, at 89, 140. 
236  Id. at 205. This seems true, for example, of signing statements: President Bush’s abuse of the 
practice tarnished legitimate, longstanding uses of signing statements. See Dawn E. Johnsen, What’s a 
President to Do? Interpreting the Constitution in the Wake of Bush Administration Abuses, 88 B.U. L. 
REV. 395, 407 (2008) (arguing that “excessive and misguided reactions can threaten legitimate 
interpretive practices” such as the use of signing statements). 
237  See supra Part I (detailing the Bush Administration’s arguments for deference in the Court’s 
9/11 detainee cases). 
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clearly not the case.238 The Commander in Chief at the Lowest Ebb focuses 
precisely on the extent to which presidents have claimed constitutional 
authority to act in defiance of a statute—in other words, examples of Justice 
Robert Jackson’s famous “zone three” in Youngstown, in which presidential 
power is at its “lowest ebb.”239 After an exhaustive review beginning with 
the Founding Era and continuing chronologically from George Washington 
to George W. Bush, Barron and Lederman conclude that President Bush’s 
view of the President’s “preclusive” war powers—that is, authority to act in 
contravention of congressional statute—indeed was exceptional: “There is a 
radical disjuncture between the approach to constitutional war powers the 
current President [Bush] has asserted and the one that prevailed at the 
moment of ratification and for much of our history that followed.”240 
Noting that President Bush’s defenders cite for historical support 
President Abraham Lincoln’s Civil War actions (generally viewed as the 
historical high-water mark of presidential assertions of preclusive war 
powers), Barron and Lederman make this period “the centerpiece” of their 
historical survey.241 They compellingly establish that President Lincoln 
provided no precedent for President Bush. To summarize just the most 
well-known, controversial incident: when President Lincoln authorized 
army generals where necessary to “suspend the writ of habeas corpus for 
the public safety” after the Confederacy had fired on Fort Sumter, it was 
only as an emergency measure because Congress was not in session.242 Far 
from claiming any preclusive power, President Lincoln used his 
constitutional authority to call Congress back into session, and his message 
on the day of its return expressly acknowledged that Congress had the last 
 
238  See Barron & Lederman, Commander in Chief—Framing the Problem, supra note 25; Barron & 
Lederman, Commander in Chief—History, supra note 25. Barron and Lederman both served in the OLC 
as career attorneys during the Clinton Administration, and later in leadership positions in the OLC at the 
outset of the Obama Administration, with Barron as the acting Assistant Attorney General heading the 
office and Lederman as Deputy Assistant Attorney General. 
239  Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
240  Barron & Lederman, Commander in Chief—History, supra note 25, at 1112. Barron and 
Lederman adopt the term “preclusive” from Justice Robert Jackson to describe presidential assertions of 
war powers that “would supersede any effort by Congress to use its own constitutional authorities to 
enact statutes that would limit the discretion the President would otherwise be constitutionally entitled to 
exercise.” Barron & Lederman, Commander in Chief—Framing the Problem, supra note 25, at 694 n.6. 
241  Barron & Lederman, Commander in Chief—History, supra note 25, at 993. For a very different 
reading of history, and favorable comparisons between President Bush and Presidents Lincoln and 
Roosevelt, see JOHN YOO, CRISIS AND COMMAND: THE HISTORY OF EXECUTIVE POWER FROM GEORGE 
WASHINGTON TO GEORGE W. BUSH ix (2009) (“I trace the genealogy of today’s [Bush Administration] 
controversies back to the nation’s first Chief Executive, George Washington, then describe how Thomas 
Jefferson, Andrew Jackson, Abraham Lincoln, and Franklin Roosevelt used the powers of their office in 
times of crisis.”). 
242  Barron & Lederman, Commander in Chief—History, supra note 25, at 998. 
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word on the subject.243 That message to Congress also contained President 
Lincoln’s famous statement, sometimes quoted out of context, suggesting 
that in order to save the nation, the President might violate a single law lest 
“all the laws but one . . . go unexecuted.”244 Noting that this suggestion of a 
narrow claim of emergency power is not analogous to President Bush’s 
claims, Professors Barron and Lederman scrutinize the historical record and 
find that “no President, as far as we know, has ever actually acted on 
Lincoln’s suggestion that a single law must be violated in order that all 
others—that the nation—be preserved.”245 
Regarding President Franklin Roosevelt, also cited by President Bush’s 
supporters, Barron and Lederman demonstrate that President Roosevelt 
simply never claimed preclusive constitutional war powers, even in the face 
of desperate circumstances during World War II. Roosevelt openly worked 
with Congress to secure necessary authority and otherwise relied on 
existing statutory authorities—which his Administration sometimes 
interpreted in legally questionable ways, but never to deny Congress’s 
ultimate authority.246 Professor Jack Goldsmith also rejects comparisons 
between Presidents Lincoln and Roosevelt and President Bush. For 
example, he unfavorably compares Bush’s “go-it-alone approach”247 to 
Roosevelt’s approach, which was “premised on the notion that presidential 
power is primarily about persuasion and consent rather than unilateral 
executive action.”248 
More generally, Barron and Lederman observe that, with the exception 
of the far narrower “superintendence power” of the Commander in Chief to 
direct military subordinates,249 presidents did not assert preclusive war 
 
243  Barron and Lederman also review President Lincoln’s constitutional argument in support of his 
authority, Congress’s ultimate suspension of the writ of habeas corpus (and almost immediate 
ratification of all of his other unilateral actions), and the Supreme Court’s response. Id. at 997–1018. 
244  Id. at 999. 
245  Barron & Lederman, Commander in Chief—Framing the Problem, supra note 25, at 747. They 
also consider instances where Presidents claimed that lesser emergencies not threatening the nation’s 
existence required them to act for a limited time in advance of Congress, due to urgent needs. Id. at 747–
48. However, President Bush did not make this type of claim. 
246  Barron & Lederman, Commander in Chief—History, supra note 25, at 1042–55. 
247  GOLDSMITH, supra note 195, at 205 (“The Bush Administration’s go-it-alone approach to many 
terrorism-related legal policy issues is the antithesis of Roosevelt’s approach in 1940–1941.”). 
248  Id. at 212; see also id. at 215 (“Lincoln and Roosevelt understood that, as Schlesinger said, the 
‘truly strong President is not the one who relies on his power to command but the one who recognizes 
his responsibility, and opportunity, to enlighten and persuade.’” (quoting ARTHUR M. SCHLESINGER, JR., 
THE IMPERIAL PRESIDENCY 326 (1973))). 
249  Professors Steven Calabresi and Christopher Yoo explore “The Unitary Executive” theory in a 
recent book of that name, by surveying the positions taken by all Presidents from George Washington to 
George W. Bush with regard to their preclusive constitutional authority to remove and direct all 
executive branch officials. Presidents clearly possess some such authority in certain circumstances, but 
the precise contours have been sharply disputed throughout our nation’s history. Most relevant to this 
Article, Calabresi and Yoo, who are leading proponents of a strong unitary executive authority beyond 
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powers until President Harry Truman and the Korean War,250 and then only 
inconsistently—until George W. Bush. The Bush Administration went far 
beyond its predecessors, pushing theory to extremes and moving from mere 
assertions of theoretical powers to “outright defiance” of statutes “for 
prolonged periods of time and on multiple fronts.”251 
C. The Obama Administration 
Writing just before President Obama’s election, Professors Barron and 
Lederman cautioned that, whoever was next elected, President Bush’s 
unprecedented claims of preclusive authority might prove difficult to roll 
back.252 This concern was well founded and widely shared: Presidents (and 
their lawyers) face strong temptations and pressures—heightened in the 
context of national security threats—to claim and preserve all the powers of 
their predecessors. It is a testament to our constitutional system that, in 
large measure, those fears have not been realized. The Obama 
Administration’s approach to executive authority and the absence of 
continued Supreme Court intervention suggest that the post-9/11 Court’s 
unusually nondeferential stance reflected, in part, the extraordinary nature 
of the Bush Administration’s claims of sweeping and preclusive executive 
authority. In this regard, President Bush continues to stand as an outlier. 
As President Obama’s first term neared its end, a contrary narrative 
emerged that emphasized continuity across the Bush and Obama 
Administrations on issues of national security and executive power, with 
 
Congress’s ability to constrain, pointedly distinguish and sharply criticize President Bush’s assertion of 
preclusive war powers, particularly for his insistence on acting in secret: 
Importantly, the [Bush] administration has taken many of its most ambitious actions . . . by secret 
classified executive orders. . . . Secret, classified, and broad uses of implied, inherent executive 
power may be problematic because they could undermine one of the core reasons why both of us 
have defended the unitary executive for our entire academic careers. One of the foundational 
arguments made in support of a unitary executive from Alexander Hamilton on down to the 
present is that a unitary executive promotes accountability by making it clear who is the one 
person responsible for the conduct of the executive branch. Such accountability is completely lost 
when the executive branch acts in secret. . . .  
 Support for the unitariness of the executive branch does not necessarily require supporting all 
of the broad claims of inherent executive authority in the foreign policy context advanced by the 
Bush administration. 
STEVEN G. CALABRESI & CHRISTOPHER S. YOO, THE UNITARY EXECUTIVE: PRESIDENTIAL POWER 
FROM WASHINGTON TO BUSH 411 (2008). 
250  The Court of course rejected President Truman’s assertion of war powers in Youngstown to 
support the seizure of the nation’s steel mills in furtherance of the war effort, but this did not constitute a 
claim of preclusive authority. There, President Truman argued that Congress had not legislated to 
preclude the seizure (in effect, it was a zone two, not a zone three, matter, as the dissenters would have 
held), and he sent a message to Congress acknowledging its ultimate authority to resolve the matter. See 
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 583 (1952). 
251  Barron & Lederman, Commander in Chief—History, supra note 25, at 1095–96. Barron & 
Lederman identify only one comparably consequential instance of statutory disregard: “the actions of 
President Ford in the extraordinary chaos of the last days of the Vietnam War.” Id. at 1095. 
252  See id. at 1112. 
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headlines like It’s Obama’s White House, but It’s Still Bush’s World,253 and 
George W. Obama?254 Some critics express profound disappointment with 
President Obama for not delivering expected change;255 others describe 
longstanding institutional pressures that they argue require structural 
changes.256 Yet others, including some former Bush Administration 
officials, emphasize continuity not to criticize but to praise President 
Obama’s choices, which presumably serves to vindicate President Bush’s 
policies.257 
President Obama’s policy choices understandably have disappointed 
some supporters who hoped for greater change and now observe significant 
continuity with policies in place at the end of the Bush Administration. 
Much of that continuity, however, resulted from the Supreme Court’s 
disapproval of some of the most extreme Bush Administration policies, 
which President Bush then abandoned or moderated by the time he left 
office. Justice Stevens’s leadership on the Court was vital to that change, as 
was pressure from within the Executive Branch and from outside the 
government—from the press, the public, nongovernmental organizations, 
and other nations. 
With regard to the claims of preclusive executive authority of central 
 
253  Julian E. Zelizer, It’s Obama’s White House, but It’s Still Bush’s World, WASH. POST, Aug. 15, 
2010, at B1. 
254  David Bromwich, George W. Obama?, CBS NEWS (Aug. 18, 2011, 10:14 AM), 
http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2011/08/18/scitech/main20094046.shtml; see also Ross Douthat, Op-
Ed, Whose Foreign Policy Is It?, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2011, at A23 (speaking of the “Bush-Obama era” 
and describing the structural imbalance of criticism against Bush coming from a major political party, 
but criticism of Obama coming only from the far left and the libertarian right). But see Andrew Sullivan, 
What Continuity?, DAILY BEAST (May 9, 2011, 12:22 PM), http://andrewsullivan.thedailybeast.com/
2011/05/what-continuity.html (rebutting Douthat’s assertions). 
255  See, e.g., Jonathan Turley, Op-Ed., Taking Liberties: Obama May Prove Disastrous in Terms of 
Protecting Our Rights, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 29, 2011, at A17 (“Candidate Obama . . . portrayed himself as 
the champion of civil liberties. However, President Obama not only retained the controversial Bush 
policies, he expanded on them.”); Glenn Greenwald, Miranda Is Obama’s Latest Victim, SALON (Mar. 
24, 2011, 9:25 AM), http://www.salon.com/2011/03/24/miranda_5 (arguing that “Obama has violently 
breached his own alleged principles when it comes to the War on Terror and the rule of law” on so many 
instances that they “are too numerous to chronicle in one place”). 
256  Professor Bruce Ackerman, for example, advocates moving many of OLC’s core responsibilities 
to a “Supreme Executive Tribunal.” See BRUCE ACKERMAN, THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE 
AMERICAN REPUBLIC (2010). But see Trevor W. Morrison, Constitutional Alarmism, 124 HARV. L. REV. 
1688 (2011) (reviewing ACKERMAN, supra, and arguing persuasively to the contrary). 
257  See, e.g., JACK GOLDSMITH, POWER AND CONSTRAINT: THE ACCOUNTABLE PRESIDENCY AFTER 
9/11 5 (2012) (“Contrary to nearly everyone’s expectations, the Obama administration would continue 
almost all of its predecessor’s policies, transforming what had seemed extraordinary under the Bush 
regime into the ‘new normal’ of American counterterrorism policy.”); YOO, supra note 241, at 443 
(“President Obama has come to have more in common with the ends of the Bush Administration’s 
terrorism policies than did Candidate Obama.”); Jane Mayer, The Trial: Eric Holder and the Battle over 
Khalid Sheikh Mohammed, NEW YORKER, Feb. 15, 2010, at 52, 54 (quoting Brad Berenson, former 
Assistant Counsel to President Bush, as saying that “from the perspective of a hawkish Bush national-
security person the glass is eighty-five per cent full in terms of continuity”). 
106:467  (2012) “The Essence of a Free Society” 
 517 
concern to this Article, it is plainly wrong to equate President Obama’s 
policies to the early Bush detainee policies, including those that prompted 
the Supreme Court’s robust review.258 President Obama, quite simply, has 
not asserted sweeping constitutional war powers to act in violation of 
federal statutes. Nor has there been any hint of secret violations of statutes. 
To the contrary, President Obama expressly rejected the Bush 
Administration’s approach as inconsistent with our legal traditions and 
values, and called instead for fighting terrorism “with an abiding confidence 
in the rule of law and due process; in checks and balances and 
accountability.”259 
President Obama has grounded his assertions of presidential war 
powers in authorities conferred by Congress, principally in the AUMF. He 
ordered the closure of secret black sites overseas and barred the use of 
extreme interrogation methods, directing compliance with the Geneva 
Conventions (expressly including Common Article 3) and the methods 
detailed in the Army Field Manual.260 He announced his intent and tried to 
close the detention center at Guantánamo Bay,261 but Congress thwarted that 
effort.262 He has not sent a single additional detainee there. He expressed his 
preference to prosecute suspected terrorists in civilian Article III courts 
when feasible, and has often done so, but Congress by legislation has 
blocked that option for the Guantánamo detainees.263 
Of course, strong grounds exist (beyond the scope of this Article) for 
policy-based disagreements with Obama Administration counterterrorism 
policies. But those policies respect legal constraints imposed by Congress 
and by international law, and reflect a more traditional and moderate 
approach to executive authority than that promoted by President Bush. For 
example, Justice Stevens, writing for the Court in Hamdan, correctly 
rejected as unlawful President Bush’s military commissions—and by 
implication his extreme interrogations policies—established without 
adequate respect for Congress, legal constraints, or expertise and good 
 
258  David Cole has provided the best of the relatively rare refutations of the charge. See David Cole, 
Breaking Away: Obama’s War on Terror Is Not “Bush Lite,” NEW REPUBLIC, Dec. 30, 2010, at 17. 
259  President Barack Obama, Remarks by the President on National Security (May 21, 2009), 
available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-office/remarks-president-national-security-5-21-09. 
260  See Exec. Order No. 13,491, 74 Fed. Reg. 4893 (Jan. 27, 2009); Memorandum from David J. 
Barron, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to the Attorney Gen., Withdrawal of 
Office of Legal Counsel Opinion (June 11, 2009); Memorandum from David J. Barron, Acting Assistant 
Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, to the Attorney Gen., Withdrawal of Office of Legal Counsel 
CIA Interrogation Opinions (Apr. 15, 2009). 
261  See Exec. Order No. 13,492, 74 Fed. Reg. 4897 (Jan. 27, 2009). 
262  See Supplemental Appropriations Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-32, § 14103(a), 123 Stat. 1859, 
1920 (barring transfers from Guantánamo to the United States). 
263  Sources documenting this vociferous, multi-year debate are voluminous. See, e.g., Mayer, supra 
note 257; Charlie Savage, In a Reversal, Military Trials for 9/11 Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 5, 2011, at 
A1; see also Obama, supra note 259 (“[W]henever feasible, we will try those who have violated 
American criminal laws in federal courts—courts provided for by the United States Constitution.”). 
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judgment from within his own Administration. President Obama acted 
within his lawful options when he elected to work with Congress to reform 
(through greater procedural, evidentiary, and appellate protections) rather 
than eliminate military commissions as one available venue for trying 
Guantánamo detainees. Where he has been unable to persuade Congress, 
President Obama has abided by congressional restrictions on his ability to 
decide how best to prosecute the war authorized by the AUMF.264 
President Obama confronted severe challenges in restoring rule-of-law 
values where discredited and discontinued Bush Administration policies 
regarding the Guantánamo detainees had continuing effect—including the 
use of torture and other extreme interrogation methods that complicate 
prosecution, and the very creation of the detention facility at Guantánamo in 
an effort to avoid the rule of law. Although President Obama has not added 
a single detainee to the 779 the Bush Administration sent to Guantánamo265 
(down to 196 when President Obama took office on January 21, 2009),266 
169 Guantánamo detainees remained as of April 2012.267 
In those cases in which the Obama Administration determined 
continued detention was appropriate, it has been strikingly—some would 
 
264  One particularly complex and controversial example illustrates that President Obama’s generally 
commendable efforts to work with Congress and abide by statutory limits occasionally brought costs for 
both executive authority and individual rights. President Obama worked with Congress to achieve 
substantial improvements in the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012 (NDAA), 
Pub. L. No. 112-81, 125 Stat. 1298 (2011). Despite continuing concerns with restrictions it placed on the 
detention, interrogation, and prosecution of suspected terrorists and to considerable criticism, he 
ultimately signed the NDAA into law in order to secure funding and other provisions he viewed as vital. 
See Presidential Statement on Signing the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012, 
2011 DAILY COMP. PRES. DOC. 978 (Dec. 31, 2011), available at http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/DCPD-
201100978/pdf/DCPD-201100978.pdf. President Obama pledged to implement the law so as to avoid its 
potential harms; for example, he would not subject a U.S. citizen to indefinite military detention without 
trial. Id. He noted the possibility, however, that he would assert preclusive constitutional authority if 
circumstances developed in which the NDAA could not be applied in a constitutional manner: 
My Administration will design the implementation procedures authorized by section 1022(c) to 
provide the maximum measure of flexibility and clarity to our counterterrorism professionals 
permissible under law. And I will exercise all of my constitutional authorities as Chief Executive 
and Commander in Chief if those procedures fall short, including but not limited to seeking the 
revision or repeal of provisions should they prove to be unworkable. 
Id. For a thoughtful evaluation of the pros and cons of the much-misunderstood NDAA, see Marty 
Lederman & Steve Vladeck, The NDAA: The Good, the Bad, and the Laws of War—Part I, OPINIO 
JURIS (Dec. 31, 2011, 5:19 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2011/12/31/the-ndaa-the-good-the-bad-and-the-
laws-of-war-part-i, and Marty Lederman & Steve Vladeck, The NDAA: The Good, the Bad, and the 
Laws of War—Part II, OPINIO JURIS (Dec. 31, 2011, 5:20 PM), http://opiniojuris.org/2011/12/31/the-
ndaa-the-good-the-bad-and-the-laws-of-war-part-ii [hereinafter Lederman & Vladeck, Part II]. 
265  GUANTANAMO REVIEW TASK FORCE, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FINAL REPORT 1 (2010), available 
at http://www.justice.gov/ag/guantanamo-review-final-report.pdf. 
266  Julie Tate & Peter Finn, The Prisoners of Guantanamo Bay, WASH. POST (Jan. 22, 2010), http://
www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/graphic/2010/01/22/GR2010012200359.html. 
267  Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of Def., Detainee Transfer Announced, No. 291-12 (Apr. 19, 2012), 
available at http://www.defense.gov/releases/release.aspx?releaseid=15202. 
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say disappointingly—successful in withstanding legal challenge. Not a 
single detainee has prevailed on appeal and secured release since the 
Supreme Court ordered habeas corpus review in Boumediene in 2008 
(though in many cases the government chose not to appeal, or voluntarily 
released or transferred detainees).268 This success and the Supreme Court’s 
decisions not to reverse any of these rulings may be attributed at least in 
part to the Obama Administration’s more modest view of executive 
authority and specifically the grounds on which it has evaluated and 
justified continued detention. 
Soon after President Obama took office, DOJ notified the courts of a 
change in position in the pending Guantánamo habeas litigation: the 
government would rely solely upon Congress’s enactment of the AUMF 
rather than an expansive view of the President’s constitutional authority. 
Also, in stark contrast to the Bush Administration, it argued that the 
interpretation of the AUMF is “necessarily informed by principles of the 
laws of war.”269 The Obama Administration maintained this view of the 
constraining effect of international law even in the face of remarkable 
opposition from a D.C. Circuit panel in Al-Bihani v. Obama, which found 
“mistaken” “the premise that the war powers granted by the AUMF and 
other statutes are limited by the international laws of war.”270 In the face of 
the panel’s efforts—essentially to expand executive power to act contrary to 
international law, even beyond that claimed by the Executive—the Obama 
Administration stood firm and argued to the full D.C. Circuit that the 
panel’s statement “does not properly reflect the state of the law,” including 
the Court’s view of international law in Hamdi and the longstanding canon 
that statutes should be construed as consistent with applicable international 
law.271 In denying rehearing en banc, the D.C. Circuit effectively sided with 
the Obama Administration and issued a statement, joined by seven judges, 
explaining that the panel’s discussion of international law “is not necessary 
to the disposition of the merits.”272 Congress later affirmed the 
Administration’s view that the detention authority should be construed in 
 
268  Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008); see Wittes, Chesney & Reynolds, supra note 22, at 
9–11. 
269  Respondents’ Memorandum Regarding the Government’s Detention Authority Relative to 
Detainees Held at Guantánamo Bay at 1, In re Guantánamo Bay Detainee Litig., Misc. No. 08-442, Nos. 
05-0763, 05-1646, 05-2378 (D.D.C. Mar. 13, 2009). In this memorandum, DOJ argued for far more 
limited deference than it had during the Bush Administration: “[C]ourts should defer to the President’s 
judgment that the AUMF, construed in light of the law-of-war principles that inform its interpretation, 
entitle him to treat members of irregular forces as state military forces are treated for purposes of 
detention.” Id. at 6 n.2. 
270  Al-Bihani v. Obama, 590 F.3d 866, 871 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 1814 (2011). 
271  Response to Petition for Rehearing and Rehearing En Banc at 5, Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d 866 (No. 
09-5051). 
272  Al-Bihani v. Obama, 619 F.3d 1, 1 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (denying rehearing en banc). 
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accordance with the law of war.273 The court of appeals also accepted the 
Administration’s position that the government is required to demonstrate 
that detainees are part of enemy forces by a preponderance of the evidence 
standard,274 even as some judges on the court have criticized the Obama 
Administration for arguing for a position that might impose on itself a 
higher-than-necessary burden of proof.275 
Of more general application, President Obama’s OLC publicly released 
a memorandum that outlines “Best Practices for OLC Legal Advice and 
Written Opinions” to guide the work of OLC lawyers on all matters, 
domestic as well as foreign.276 The memorandum “reaffirms the 
longstanding principles” that typically guide OLC (though clearly did not 
for some post-9/11 advice). Most important, consistent with the President’s 
constitutional obligation to “take Care that the Laws be faithfully 
executed,” OLC’s lawyers must “provide an accurate and honest appraisal 
of applicable law, even if that appraisal will constrain the Administration’s 
or an agency’s pursuit of desired practices or policy objectives.”277 As the 
memorandum correctly notes, this obligation is especially important 
because OLC “is frequently asked to opine on issues of first impression that 
are unlikely to be resolved by the courts—a circumstance in which OLC’s 
advice may effectively be the final word on the controlling law.”278 From all 
that is publicly known, OLC has adhered to these best practices under 
President Obama and has restored integrity to the critical function of 
advising the President and his executive officers. 
Although a comprehensive review of the Obama Administration’s 
assertions of executive authority is beyond the scope of this Article, two 
matters merit note for prompting serious criticism on rule-of-law grounds. 
According to public reports, President Obama disagreed with and did not 
follow OLC’s advice on the interpretation of the War Powers Resolution as 
 
273  Lederman & Vladeck, Part II, supra note 264. 
274  See Al-Bihani, 590 F.3d at 878. 
275  See, e.g., Al-Adahi v. Obama, 613 F.3d 1102, 1105 (D.C. Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 131 S. Ct. 
1001 (2011) (“We are thus left with no adversary presentation on an important question affecting many 
pending cases . . . . Although we doubt, for the reasons stated above, that the Suspension Clause requires 
the use of the preponderance standard, we will not decide the question in this case.”). Judge Laurence 
Silberman suggested that the D.C. Circuit actually might not apply the preponderance standard: “I doubt 
any of my colleagues will vote to grant a [habeas] petition if he or she believes that it is somewhat likely 
that the petitioner is an al Qaeda adherent or an active supporter.” Esmail v. Obama, 639 F.3d 1075, 
1078 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (Silberman, J., concurring). For a careful review of the D.C. Circuit’s detainee 
rulings, see Vladeck, supra note 14. 
276  Memorandum from David J. Barron, Acting Assistant Attorney Gen., Office of Legal Counsel, 
to Attorneys of the Office of Legal Counsel, Best Practices for OLC Legal Advice and Written Opinions 
(July 16, 2010), available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/pdf/olc-legal-advice-opinions.pdf (internal 
quotation marks omitted). 
277  Id. at 1. 
278  Id. 
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applied to U.S. military action in Libya.279 The War Powers Resolution 
(among other things) requires the President to withdraw U.S. military forces 
from “hostilities” sixty days after introduction if Congress has not 
specifically authorized continuation of the use of force.280 OLC reportedly 
advised that operations in Libya, including multiple unpiloted drone air 
attacks, constituted hostilities.281 Public reports can of course be inaccurate, 
but this reported interpretation seems the correct one—which means that the 
continued operations in Libya violated the War Powers Resolution.282 Even 
assuming, however, that continuation of the Libya operation violated the 
law as best interpreted, comparisons with the Bush Administration’s flawed 
legal interpretations and claims of preclusive authority were misplaced.283 
The Obama Administration publicly provided a plausible (if ultimately 
unconvincing) explanation of its interpretation that relied in part on past 
presidential practice, including through detailed Senate testimony by State 
Department Legal Advisor Harold Koh.284 Far from making any claim of 
preclusive authority, President Obama made plain he was not challenging 
the constitutionality of the sixty-day clock (as President Richard Nixon had 
in vetoing the War Powers Resolution) or other limits Congress might 
impose on the operation.285 
 
279  See Charlie Savage, 2 Top Lawyers Lose Argument on War Power, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 2011, 
at A1. The President certainly may act against OLC’s advice (which, in fact, rarely happens), but he 
should do so based on a good-faith substantive difference as to the best legal interpretation, one that is 
not inappropriately driven by desired outcome. All accounts suggest OLC provided accurate advice in 
the Libya matter, but the process may have been complicated by the lack of a confirmed head of OLC. 
The Senate did not hold a vote on President Obama’s nominees for the first two and a half years of his 
administration. In the interest of full disclosure, I was President Obama’s first nominee and withdrew 
after waiting more than a year for a Senate vote. 
280  See 50 U.S.C. § 1544(b) (2006). 
281  Savage, supra note 279; see also Memorandum from Caroline D. Krass, Principal Deputy 
Assistant Attorney Gen., to the Attorney Gen., Authority to Use Military Force in Libya (Apr. 1, 2011), 
available at www.justice.gov/olc/2011/authority-military-use-in-libya.pdf (memorializing the legal 
advice given by OLC to the Attorney General before the commencement of military operations in 
Libya). 
282  Dawn Johnsen, Different Kinds of Wrong: The Difference Between Obama’s Libya Policy and 
Bush’s Torture Policy, SLATE (July 5, 2011, 6:17 PM), http://www.slate.com/id/2298436. 
283  The comparison came from both sides: those critical of the Libya operation, see Bruce 
Ackerman, Op-Ed., Legal Acrobatics, Illegal War, N.Y. TIMES, June 21, 2011, at A27, and those who 
argued it was lawful and helped vindicate the Bush Administration’s legal interpretations on torture, see 
Eric Posner, Stop Complaining About Harold Koh’s Interpretation of the War Powers Act, NEW 
REPUBLIC (July 1, 2011, 12:00 AM), http://www.tnr.com/article/politics/91166/harold-koh-war-powers-
john-yoo-libya. 
284  Libya and War Powers: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 112th Cong. 7 
(2011) (testimony of Harold Hongju Koh, Legal Advisor, U.S. Department of State). 
285  See Richard Nixon, Veto of the War Powers Resolution, PUB. PAPERS 893, 893 (Oct. 24, 1973). 
In fact, Department of State legal advisor Harold Koh, in responding to written questions from Senator 
Richard Lugar after the hearing on Libya, affirmed that the Obama Administration agreed instead with 
the Carter Administration’s conclusion that the sixty-day clock was constitutional. Libya and War 
Powers: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on Foreign Relations, 112th Cong. 53 (2011) (responses of legal 
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The second serious charge of unlawful action is aimed at the United 
States’ use of unpiloted drones to target and kill certain suspected terrorist 
leaders abroad, and in particular the reported September 2011 killing in 
Yemen of U.S. citizen Anwar al-Awlaki.286 Preliminary to the merits, and 
salient to this Article’s concerns, is whether the Obama Administration 
made public adequate information about the program and its legal rationale, 
sufficient for Congress, interested citizens, and other observers to provide 
the kind of external check on both the wisdom and legality of executive 
action that proved vital during the Bush Administration. Classified 
programs and covert actions often involve difficult judgments of how best 
to balance competing requirements for secrecy and democratic 
accountability. Thus far, the Obama Administration has refused to release 
or even acknowledge the existence of an OLC opinion that, according to the 
New York Times, provided the legal basis for proceeding with the 
operation.287 Instead, some months after al-Awlaki’s killing, Attorney 
General Eric Holder and other Obama Administration officials gave 
speeches providing considerable detail on the circumstances in which the 
Administration considers such a killing lawful.288 The analysis turns on 
highly fact-dependent questions of both domestic and international law, 
which for a U.S. citizen include constitutional guarantees such as the Fifth 
Amendment’s guarantee of due process. Here, the Administration should 
release additional information on the internal executive processes and 
standards and provide a redacted OLC opinion or substitute memorandum 
detailing the legal analysis. The Attorney General and other officials, 
however, already have provided adequate detail to establish that far from an 
 
advisor Harold Koh to questions submitted by Sen. Richard G. Lugar). 
286  Mark Mezzetti, Eric Schmitt & Robert F. Worth, C.I.A. Strike Kills U.S.-Born Militant in a Car 
in Yemen, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 1, 2011, at A1. 
287  See Charlie Savage, Secret U.S. Memo Made Legal Case to Kill a Citizen, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 9, 
2011, at A1. 
288  John O. Brennan, Assistant to the President for Homeland Sec. & Counterterrorism, Remarks to 
the Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars: “The Ethics and Efficacy of the President’s 
Counterterrorism Strategy” (Apr. 30, 2012), available at http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/04/
brennanspeech; Att’y Gen. Eric Holder, Remarks at Northwestern University School of Law (Mar. 5, 
2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/iso/opa/ag/speeches/2012/ag-speech-1203051.html; Jeh 
Charles Johnson, Gen. Counsel to the Dep’t of Def., Remarks at Yale Law School, National Security 
Law, Lawyers and Lawyering in the Obama Administration (Feb. 22, 2012), available at 
http://www.lawfareblog.com/2012/02/jeh-johnson-speech-at-yale-law-school. The Obama 
Administration also relies on constitutional sources of executive authority for national security activities, 
as particularly noted in an April 2012 speech by another national security official. See Stephen W. 
Preston, Gen. Counsel to the Cent. Intelligence Agency, Remarks at Harvard Law School (Apr. 10, 
2012), available at https://www.cia.gov/news-information/speeches-testimony/2012-speeches-
testimony/cia-general-counsel-harvard.html. Still, nothing in this speech or elsewhere suggests the 
Obama Administration acted based on an overly broad theory of executive authority, whether in the 
absence of or in contravention of congressional action. If anything, the targeted drone killings, and even 
more the Libya/sixty-day clock examples are viewed by some as controversial interpretations of 
statutory provisions supportive of desired executive action. 
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assertion of preclusive executive power, President Obama has relied on his 
interpretation of authority granted by Congress through the AUMF.289  
President Obama may have contributed to exaggerated claims that he 
has simply continued Bush Administration policies by emphasizing the 
“need to look forward as opposed to looking backwards,”290 including when 
a week before even taking office he was asked whether he might appoint a 
special prosecutor to investigate possible Bush Administration violations of 
law. A few months later, when President Obama announced the clearly 
correct position that the government would not prosecute any government 
employee who reasonably relied in good faith on DOJ legal advice, he 
again elaborated more sweepingly: “[A]t a time of great challenges and 
disturbing disunity, nothing will be gained by spending our time and energy 
laying blame for the past.”291 He similarly explained his opposition to 
creating a fact-finding commission to investigate torture or other potential 
wrongdoing: 
 I’ve opposed the creation of such a commission because I believe that our 
existing democratic institutions are strong enough to deliver accountability. 
The Congress can review abuses of our values, and there are ongoing inquiries 
by the Congress into matters like enhanced interrogation techniques. The 
Department of Justice and our courts can work through and punish any 
violations of our laws or miscarriages of justice.292 
President Obama was right in theory: existing institutions—DOJ and 
the courts, as well as Congress—theoretically can provide for appropriate 
accountability and protect against future executive abuses. Whether steps 
taken toward public accountability will prove sufficient is not yet known. 
Early in his Administration, President Obama took a vital step by releasing 
and repudiating Bush-era OLC memos on harsh interrogation methods.293 It 
 
289  For example, the Obama Administration views the President’s authority as not limited 
geographically, except to the extent international law imposes sovereignty-based limits on the use of 
force, and as authorizing the use of force against the operational leaders of al Qaeda and cobelligerent 
forces in the armed conflict with the United States. For the Administration’s public explanation to date 
of the extent of its authority to engage in targeted killings using drones, see sources cited supra note 
288. 
290  George Stephanopoulos, Obama Leaves Door Open (a Bit) on Prosecuting Bush Officials, ABC 
NEWS (Jan. 11, 2009, 9:16 AM), http://abcnews.go.com/blogs/politics/2009/01/obama-leaves-do 
(providing transcript of a This Week interview with Obama); see also Aide: Obama Won’t Prosecute 
Bush Officials, CBS NEWS (Apr. 20, 2009, 10:36 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/stories/2009/04/20/
politics/main4955428.shtml. 
291  Press Release, The White House Office of the Press Sec’y, Statement of President Barack 
Obama on Release of OLC Memos (Apr. 16, 2009), available at http://www.whitehouse.gov/the-press-
office/statement-president-barack-obama-release-olc-memos. 
292 Obama, supra note 259. 
293 See Press Release, supra note 291. His DOJ, however, also has vigorously defended against 
individual lawsuits alleging harm from the Bush Administration’s unlawful actions, including with 
assertions of state secrets, qualified immunity, and special factors to defeat Bivens claims—and it has 
failed to offer compensation or even acknowledgment in circumstances of clear governmental 
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seems that as a nation the United States has not yet reached consensus that 
the Bush Administration’s abuses were fundamentally wrong and should 
not be repeated.294 
CONCLUSION 
Viewed together and in context, the Supreme Court’s 9/11 detainee 
rulings, with Justice Stevens playing the leading role, effected substantial 
changes in national counterterrorism policies. Although not the direct 
subject of any of its cases, ending the unlawful practices of waterboarding 
and other methods of torture was surely among the most significant direct 
changes wrought by the Court. More fundamentally, the Court helped 
restore the rule of law and the constitutional balance of powers. The rulings 
are best understood in the context of an Administration that, following 
 
wrongdoing. See, e.g., Vance v. Rumsfeld, 653 F.3d 591 (7th Cir. 2011), vacated and reh’g en banc 
granted, Nos. 10-1687 & 10-2442, 2011 U.S. App. LEXIS 22083 (7th Cir. Oct. 28, 2011) (pending en 
banc rehearing of the panel’s ruling in favor of a Bivens claim proceeding on allegations of torture); 
Mohamed v. Jeppesen Dataplan, Inc., 614 F.3d 1070 (9th Cir. 2010) (en banc) (dismissing case on basis 
of government’s assertion of state secrets but encouraging voluntary action to compensate injured 
individuals whose meritorious claims cannot proceed due to secrecy concerns, emphasizing the 
government’s responsibility to promote justice, especially when judicial review is not possible); Arar v. 
Ashcroft, 585 F.3d 559 (2d Cir. 2009) (en banc) (dismissing Bivens claim by a man to whom the 
Canadian government awarded millions of dollars following a governmental inquiry that found he was 
the victim of torture due to U.S. and Canadian action). 
294 As President Obama’s first term drew to an end, some of his critics have portrayed President 
Obama as dangerously weak and have continued to argue that waterboarding is not torture or unlawful 
and that, in any event, it yields valuable information. Even in the immediate wake of the killing of 
Osama bin Laden, some former Bush Administration officials sought to turn that Obama Administration 
success into support for Bush Administration policies of waterboarding and other extreme interrogation 
techniques. See, e.g., Michael B. Mukasey, Op-Ed., The Waterboarding Trail to bin Laden, WALL ST. J., 
May 6, 2011, at A15 (criticizing Obama’s interrogation practices and arguing that the intelligence 
leading to bin Laden could be traced to the Bush Administration’s repeated waterboarding of detainees). 
But see John McCain, Op-Ed., The Damage Torture Does, WASH. POST, May 12, 2011, at A21 
(describing former Attorney General Mukasey’s claim as “false,” and arguing that waterboarding 
“produced false and misleading information” and, in any event, is wrong). Justice Stevens himself, in 
remarks as part of this Northwestern University School of Law symposium, made news for his candid 
praise of President Obama with regard to killing bin Laden. See Jess Bravin, Justice Stevens: Killing bin 
Laden Was Lawful, WALL ST. J. BLOG (May 13, 2011, 7:14 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2011/
05/13/justice-stevens-killing-bin-laden-was-lawful (quoting Justice Stevens as saying he had “not the 
slightest doubt that it was entirely appropriate for U.S. forces” to target bin Laden and that he was proud 
of President Obama for making the decision to execute the operation); see also 60 Minutes: Hard 
Measures: Ex-CIA Head Defends Post-9/11 Tactics (CBS television broadcast Apr. 29, 2012), available 
at http://www.cbsnews.com/video/watch/?id=7406950n&tag=contentBody;storyMediaBox (noting the 
comments of Jose Rodriguez, former head of CIA’s clandestine operations, who defended his 
destruction of videotapes depicting waterboarding of suspected terrorists and other post-9/11 U.S. 
actions, expressing “no regrets”). A pending Senate Intelligence Committee investigation into the Bush 
Administration’s interrogation policies promises to help set the public record straight. See Joint 
Statement of Sen. Dianne Feinstein, Chairman S. Intelligence Comm., and Sen. Carl Levin, Chairman, 
S. Armed Servs. Comm. (Apr. 27, 2012), available at http://www.feinstein.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/
files/serve?File_id=026a329b-d4c0-4ab3-9f7e-fad5671917cc. 
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brutal attacks on America, sought unprecedented expansions of executive 
power, discretion, secrecy, and deference. The Court forced the Bush 
Administration to abandon its go-it-alone stance and instead to respect 
traditional checks on executive power: from the Court, from Congress, from 
within the Executive Branch, and—with greater transparency—from the 
American people. It is important to recall that the course of litigation and 
public response depended in part upon leaked documents, a contingency 
upon which the rule of law and constitutional balance should not depend. In 
time, the cases may well be remembered not primarily as post-9/11 cases 
concerning the Executive’s authority over suspected terrorists, but as part of 
a select line of landmark cases that secures the deep and lasting structure of 
our constitutional commitment to democracy, separation of powers, and the 
rule of law, even in the face of daunting challenges. Justice Stevens, more 
than any other Justice, ensured the Court’s continued commitment to these 
principles and earned posterity’s recognition for a job well done. 
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